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ABSTRACT 
If it’s “Made in China,” would you still buy it? This question has recently taken 
on particular significance in the wake of a series of scandalous oversights regarding the 
safety of consumer products manufactured in China. If this trend continues it could 
damage the sales of Chinese produced goods in the international market place. While, it 
may appear to be a relatively minor issue in the context of China’s overall political 
economy generally, and its dramatic economic growth of the past few decades more 
particularly, if it is not addressed the consequences could actually be quite serious. If this 
issue on its own, or in combination with other problems, drastically undermined China’s 
economic growth, the ruling Chinese Communist Party might find itself facing increased 
domestic instability. Domestic instability in China could in turn contribute to regional 
instability in Northeast and Southeast Asia. In this context, this thesis outlines realistic 
policy options that the Chinese government could implement to both address consumer 
product safety in the future and mitigate contemporary concerns following the recent bout 
of consumer product safety lapses. More broadly, this thesis moves beyond simply laying 
out policy prescriptions and presents a new institutional arrangement that if implemented 
would prevent future product safety problems. It provides a policy framework that if 
followed would effectively address international and domestic concerns with respect to 
the quality and safety of Chinese products. Figure 1 provides a succinct summary of the 
thesis and its relevance to a neglected, but endemic problem.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
China’s central government’s response to the current challenge of consumer 
product safety in the food and drug arena could be a determining factor in its ability to 
sustain robust economic growth over the next decade. Numerous policy prescriptions and 
an overall framework are proposed here to strengthen China’s institutional weakness in 
relation to the oversight of consumer product safety. However, three measures in 
particular have the ability to strike at the heart of the consumer product safety dilemma 
and restore consumer faith in the “Made in China” brand. First, China must stem 
corruption at the local level by introducing independent regulatory and law enforcement 
agencies that hold local government leaders and companies accountable.1 Second, China 
must permit greater freedom of the press because the media can act as a force multiplier 
to expose systemic problems of corruption that relate to consumer product safety issues. 
Finally, China must create an independent judicial system that consistently holds 
government officials and companies that intentionally violate product safety laws 
accountable. The implementation of these measures would change the political economy 
of China at many levels. Their full-scale application would break deeply entrenched 
patterns of behavior by Chinese Communist Party officials and Chinese companies. 
Change will not be easy; however, it is necessary in order to maintain economic growth 
and political stability in China in the medium-term.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Wayne M. Morrison, "China-U.S. Trade Issues," in CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, March 7, 2008), 10. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How should the Chinese government respond in order to improve China’s 
consumer product safety regime with respect to food and drugs, so that the Chinese 
government can protect the country’s export driven economic growth and retain, or 
strengthen the confidence of consumers world-wide? 
1. If It’s “Made in China,” Would You Still Buy It? 
The phrase – “Made in China” – has for many years meant acceptable consumer 
goods that are manufactured at a low cost to American producers and consumers; 
however, “Made in China” has more recently been linked to scandalous oversights with 
respect to consumer product safety. If the trend continues, it could damage the sales of 
Chinese produced goods in the international market place. Although no American 
consumers have died because of food or drug related consumer safety lapses to date, 
some domestic (Chinese) consumers, especially infants, have died.2 Unless changes are 
made to China’s product safety regime many more domestic and international consumers 
are likely to fall ill or die. The quality and safety of food and drugs produced in China 
remains one of the primary concerns of international consumers, companies, and 
lawmakers. A recent Congressional Research Service report to the United States congress 
summarizes the growing concern surrounding Chinese food and drug imports. The report 
notes that global consumers suffer from dangerous Chinese products that range from 
                                                 
2 Wayne M. Morrison, "Health and Safety Concerns over U.S. Imports of Chinese Products: An 
Overview," in CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, August 28, 
2007), 4. 
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melamine tainted pet food, unsafe seafood, and counterfeit toothpaste.3 Furthermore, 
according to the China National Food Industry Association, “Food is China’s biggest 
industry”. Output for 2006 was calculated to be worth 315.8 billion U.S. dollars (2.4 
trillion Yuan).4 In light of numerous product safety incidents and the economic 
significance of food safety and quality, the Chinese government, which initially 
dismissed many of the claims as protectionist measures, has been compelled to respond in 
order to protect foreign trade, which has been the lifeblood of China’s economic growth.5 
2. Research Question 
How should the Chinese government respond in order to improve China’s 
consumer product safety regime with respect to food and drugs, so that the Chinese 
government can protect the country’s export driven economic growth and it large 
international market, which includes a large number of U.S. consumers?  
                                                 
3 Morrison, "Health and Safety Concerns over U.S. Imports of Chinese Products: An Overview," 1. 
Morrison notes: “The [United States] Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in March 2007 issued 
warnings and announced voluntary recalls on certain pet foods (or products such as rice protein concentrate 
and wheat gluten used to manufacture pet food and animal feed) from China believed to have caused the 
sickness and deaths of numerous pets in the United States. In May 2007, the FDA issued warnings on 
certain toothpaste products (some of which were found to be counterfeit) found to originate in China that 
contained poisonous chemicals. In June 2007, the FDA announced import controls on all farm-raised 
catfish, bass, shrimp, dace (related to carp), and eel from China after antimicrobial agents, which are not 
approved in the United States for use in farm-raised aquatic animals, were found. Such shipments will be 
detained until they are proven to be free of contaminants.” 
4 Wu Chen and Wu Qiong, "China: En Route to Better Food Safety," Xinhua 16 September 2007. 
5 "Stoking Protectionism: Substandard Exports from China Provoke Protectionist Responses," in The 
Economist (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 16 August 2007). 
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B. LITERATURE/POLICY REVIEW 
1. Areas of Scholarly/Policy Consensus 
In order to protect the “Made in China” brand from further damage, most policy 
makers agree that the Chinese government has to respond with better laws to regulate the 
production and recall of consumer products. It needs to engage in a vigorous effort to 
enforce new and existing consumer product laws and improve inspection to ensure the 
quality of goods for both export and domestic consumption.6 In order to address these 
issues, Chinese government officials, manufacturers, and regulatory agencies recently 
met to discuss product safety. Xinhua (New China News Agency) reports that the 
meeting sought to establish clear product safety guidelines that would assist with 
sustained economic growth for China.7 As a result, on July 27, 2007, the Chinese 
National Quality Control Conference in Beijing reached a consensus on principles that 
should define an improved product safety regulatory and enforcement regime in China.8 
Consensus at the conference led to cooperation among domestic policy makers in the 
                                                 
6 Morrison, "Health and Safety Concerns over U.S. Imports of Chinese Products: An Overview." – 
This recent report to the United States Congress states: “China is believed to have a rather weak health and 
safety regime for manufactured goods and agricultural products. Problems include weak consumer 
protection laws and poorly enforced regulations, lack of inspections and ineffective penalties for code 
violators, underfunded and understaffed regulatory agencies and poor interagency cooperation, the 
proliferation of fake goods and ingredients, the existence of numerous unlicensed producers, falsified 
export documents, extensive pollution, intense competition that often induces firms to cut corners, the 
relative absence of consumer protection advocacy groups, failure by Chinese companies to effectively 
monitor the quality of their suppliers’ products, restrictions on the media, and extensive government 
corruption and lack of accountability, especially at the local government level.” 
7 "Beijing Launches Massive Checkup for Product Quality, Food Safety," Xinhua 3 September 2007. 
Xinhua notes: “The meeting's main agenda was: profoundly implementing the scientific development 
concept, [to] study and analyze the new situation facing product quality, [to] set clear guidelines for quality 
control in the days to come and [to] take powerful measures for improving the overall quality of Chinese 
products so as to ensure a good and rapid national economic growth (sic).” 
8 "China's Wen Jiabao, Wu Yi Address National Conference on Product Safety," Xinhua 27 July 2007. 
– “Wen Jiabao, [member of the CCP Central Committee Political Bureau Standing Committee and 
premiere of the State Council], pointed out: Product quality has a close bearing on the people’s vital 
interests, on businesses’ survival and development, and on the image of the country.” Furthermore, “Wen 
Jiabao put forth the following six requirements to be met today and in the days to come: (1) Tightening up 
quality control in all areas… (2) Speeding up the formulation of standards for product quality… (3) 
Improving product quality from the source… (4) Formulating stronger laws for ensuring product quality… 
(5) Pooling efforts to launch a special drive to control product quality… (6) Tightening up the management 
of public opinion and information.” 
  4
development of a new recall and food monitoring system to guard against tainted 
products. In fact, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine (AQSIQ), China’s quality watchdog, announced the first recall system for 
unsafe food and toys on 31 August 2007.9  
In addition to the recall system, the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) expanded 
food labeling requirements and directed the establishment of a new food-tracking and 
monitoring system to support food safety during the 2008 Olympics.10 Yifen Wang, a 
biosystems engineer at Auburn University, underlined the importance of the success of 
China’s food safety system during the Beijing Olympics. Wang noted that Beijing had to 
provide nearly 600 tons of food for at least 32,000 athletes and journalist in addition to an 
unknown number of Olympic spectators from across the globe.11 In the wake of the 
Beijing Summer Olympics, no major reports of food contamination or food borne illness 
have surfaced. However, despite the ostensible commitment on the part of the General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), and the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) to improve product safety, their contributions will be 
slight unless Chinese governmental officials and regulators continue to enforce the new 
laws, now that the international spotlight associated with the 2008 Olympics has moved 
on. 
Both domestic and international policy makers agree that the major obstacle to 
improving product safety lies in the lack of ability and willingness of local level Chinese 
regulators and government officials to enforce the law. In many cases local level officials 
                                                 
9 "Beijing Launches Massive Checkup for Product Quality, Food Safety." 
10 "Product-Quality Scandals Persist," in The Economist (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 6 
September 2007). 
11 Jamie Creamer and Charles Martin, "Auburn University Professor Helps Ensure Food Safety for 
Olympics,"  http://wireeagle.auburn.edu/news/409. (accessed September 2008). Wang noted in the 
interview: “With more than 10,000 athletes and 22,000-plus international journalist in Beijing, China, for 
the 2008 Summer Olympic Games [food safety was a paramount concern for the Chinese 
government]…The volume of food [prepared] for the Olympic Village and for the concession [included] 
330 tongs of fruits and vegetables, 130 tons of meat, 82 tons of seafood, 21 tons of cheese and 19 tons of 
eggs…There [was] great pressure on [the Beijing Municipal Food Safety Committee and the Beijing 
Organizing Committee for the 2008 Olympic Games] to ensure that all foods that [entered] the athletes’ 
village, media villages, main press center and international broadcasting center at the games are safe.” 
  5
own a portion of the same companies that they are supposed to be regulating and 
monitoring. Obviously, this creates a conflict of interest. As The Economist has noted, 
“Unhealthy links between government and business, combined with patchy 
implementation of rules and regulations, mean that China has a political culture that will 
be hard to transform quickly.”12 
In addition to poor cooperation and enforcement at the local government level, 
China must also contend with under-staffed and under-funded oversight national agencies 
that have shown little ability to coordinate their activities in the effort to improve product 
safety in China.13 There is a pronounced lack of coordination between China’s Ministry 
of Agriculture (MOA), the Ministry of Health (MOH), the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), and the State Food and Drug Administration 
(SFDA).14 The continued lack of interagency cooperation on product safety issues in 
China could potentially lead to far more devastating effects than the problems that 
surfaced inside and outside the country in 2007. 
Against the backdrop of this interagency dilemma, China has already set aside 
additional funds and created a task force to assist in domestic interagency cooperation to 
promote product safety and protect the “Made in China” label. In July 2007 the Chinese 
central government appointed Vice Premier Wu Yi, who skillfully handled the Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003, to head a food safety and product 
quality task force aimed at restoring the Chinese brand image.15 Additionally, the central 
government reports that it plans to spend approximately “$1.1 billion to improve food 
                                                 
12 "Stoking Protectionism: Substandard Exports from China Provoke Protectionist Responses." 
13 David Barboza, "China in Public Relations Offensive for Products," The International Herald 
Tribune 6 September 2007, John Gapper, "China Pledges to Raise Safety Standards," Financial Times 31 
August 2007, Morrison, "Health and Safety Concerns over U.S. Imports of Chinese Products: An 
Overview." 
14 Chen and Qiong, "China: En Route to Better Food Safety.", Morrison, "Health and Safety Concerns 
over U.S. Imports of Chinese Products: An Overview." 
15 "Product-Quality Scandals Persist." 
  6
and drug safety supervision by 2010.”16 Both measures will help to resolve the problems 
that plague China’s consumer product safety regulatory regime. 
In addition to domestic cooperation, China has sought international cooperation in 
its attempt to resolve the current consumer product safety crisis. China’s President Hu 
and the United States’ President Bush recently agreed to support one another through 
international interagency cooperation in order to protect trade and improve the safety of 
Chinese exported goods.17 Even before the two leaders met, international interagency 
cooperation had already begun. As recently as August 2, 2007, representatives of the 
United States’ Food and Drug Administration were in China conducting high-level talks 
about food and drug safety with their Chinese counterparts.18 
In summary, the areas of policy consensus on China’s product safety regime 
among domestic and international policy makers include the following: 
• China must adopt regulatory measures and standards that promote product 
safety. 
• China must enforce these measures at all levels despite the corruption and 
poor oversight practices of local level Chinese officials.  
• China’s national oversight agencies must be properly funded and 
coordinated in order to monitor compliance among China’s large number 
of producers.  
• International interagency cooperation must continue in order to assist 
China in its effort to quickly improve the consumer product safety regime 
of its rapidly growing, export-driven economy. 
                                                 
16 David Barboza, "China Acts to Cleanse Reputation," The New York Times 5 September 2007. 
17 Dana Perino, "White House Press Briefing by Deputy Press Secretary Dana Perino,"  (Sydney, 
Australia: White House, 6 September 2007). - “President Hu raised the issue of product safety [during a 
recent economic conference in Sydney, Australia with President Bush], explaining that the Chinese 
government took this problem seriously. [President Hu] (He) explained that it related to health and safety of 
Chinese consumers, as well as those in export markets. The two leaders, [President Hu and President 
Bush], discussed new interagency structures of China, revisions to their laws and regulations, and enhanced 
enforcement and inspections being undertaken by China. President Bush welcomed these developments, 
explained the U.S. concerns on safety, underscoring that the safety issue was not trade protectionism, and 
that both sides needed to continue to work together. President Hu expressed his welcome for expanded 
cooperation on the safety issue.” 
18 Ariana Eunjung Cha, "A Tough Trek toward Common Ground in China; Paulson Sets out to Ease 
Tension by Sticking to Areas of Agreement," The Washington Post 2 August 2007. 
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2. Areas of Scholarly/Policy Debate 
Despite a policy consensus on many product safety issues at the domestic and 
international level, there is an ever-widening gulf between policy makers at the 
international level over protectionism that masquerades as international concern for 
Chinese product safety and media sensationalism that targets China.  
On the issue of protectionism, protecting domestic industries from foreign 
competition, Chinese government officials, specifically the Assistant Minister of 
Commerce Wang Chao, charged that some United States government officials are 
exploiting and sensationalizing the recent export safety scandals to protect American 
companies from competition by Chinese producers.19 However, President Bush 
dismissed the idea that the United States concern with the product safety of Chinese 
goods had anything to do with protectionism.20 Nevertheless, as The Economist observed, 
“China has historically tended to regard ‘quality’-related bans and restrictions as a form 
of non-tariff protectionism.”21 Admittedly, the United States Congress has recently 
passed several measures and amendments to protect Americans from tainted food and 
drug products, yet these measures make it more difficult and expensive for Chinese 
                                                 
19 "Stoking Protectionism; Substandard Exports from China Provoke Protectionist Responses.", Ken 
DeWoskin, "The 'Made in China' Stigma Shock," Far Eastern Economic Review 170, no. 7 (2007): 11, 
"Protectionism," Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9061595/protectionism. (accessed 
September 2008) 
20 Perino, "White House Press Briefing by Deputy Press Secretary Dana Perino." 
21 "Stoking Protectionism: Substandard Exports from China Provoke Protectionist Responses." 
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exporters to get their products to the United States’ market.22 If the debate over 
protectionism cannot be resolved amicably, miscalculations by both governments could 
lead to a protectionist trade war, “which could mean further bans on U.S. products on 
spurious “health” or “quality” grounds.”23 A Sino-U.S. trade war could devastate the 
global economy that has grown increasingly dependent on China over the last decade.  
Further aggravating cooperative efforts on product safety reform between China 
and other governments is China’s belief that the foreign media has sensationalized the 
lapses in China’s product safety regime. The Economist reported that “As the [product 
safety] crisis unfolded, China’s first instinct” was “to issue denials, and to claim that the 
product-safety issue has been whipped up out of proportion by the foreign media.”24 
However, there was nothing sensational about the reporting of the death of 50 to 60 
infants from fake baby formula, 11 people from toxic gall bladder treatments, and seven 
from defective antibiotic drugs was an indictment of China’s consumer product safety 
regime.25 While deeming such reportage sensationalist, the Chinese government often 
                                                 
22 Geoffrey S. Becker, "Food and Agricultural Imports from China," in CRS Report for Congress 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 20070717 - July 17, 2007), 15. – “On May 2, 2007, 
Senator Durbin won unanimous approval of an amendment to the Senate-passed FDA Revitalization Act 
(S. 1082) that would require domestic and foreign facilities to notify the [United States Food and Drug 
Administration] FDA of food safety problems; would require FDA to establish a central registry for 
collecting information about adulterated human or animal foods; and would require FDA to implement 
uniform national standards and labeling for pet foods.” Furthermore, “Senator Durbin in July [2007] also 
introduced S. 1776, which would impose new user fees of $20 per line item of imports to help defray the 
costs of inspections, increase the number of inspectors, and pay for research into new testing methods. 
Further, the measure would require foreign governments or firms that want to import food into the United 
States to be certified by FDA as having equivalent food safety programs…A similar House bill (H.R. 2997) 
was introduced by Representative Kaptur.” Tom Plate, "Self-Defeating Hysteria over Chinese Exports," 
South China Morning Post 30 August 2007. – “Senior Democratic Senator Dick Durbin and others are 
actually calling for a ban on all toy imports from mainland China to the US.” Additionally, “…Democratic 
presidential candidate Hillary Rodham Clinton: she wants Washington to get “tougher on China.” 
23 "Stoking Protectionism: Substandard Exports from China Provoke Protectionist Responses.", Ken 
DeWoskin, "The 'Made in China' Stigma Shock," Far Eastern Economic Review 170, no. 7 (2007): 11. 
24 "No More Toying Around," in The Economist (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 10 September 
2007). 
25 Morrison, "Health and Safety Concerns over U.S. Imports of Chinese Products: An Overview." – 
“In June 2004, the Chinese People’s Daily reported that fake baby formula had killed 50 to 60 infants in 
China.” – “In June 2006, the China Daily reported that 11 people had died from a tainted injection used to 
treat gall bladders. The drug reportedly contained a toxic chemical, which some reports stated was sold to 
the Chinese pharmaceutical manufacturer without its knowledge, while others claimed that the company 
used the chemical to cut cost.” Most recently, “In August 2006, Xinhua News Agency reported that a 
defective antibiotic drug killed seven people and sickened many others.” 
  9
rejects goods from the United States, and from other nations, which are deemed unsafe, 
yet the international media is unable to report on whether there is, in fact, a product safety 
violation problem.26 Additionally, if Chinese exported products are so dangerous then 
why do Japan, the United States, and the European Union accept over 99 percent of the 
Chinese products that their regulatory agencies inspect?27 
In summary, the areas of policy debate on China’s product safety regime among 
international policy makers consist of the following: 
• Alleged protectionism to protect foreign domestic markets from Chinese 
imports. 
• Alleged media sensationalism that may either be serving as a productive 
“whistleblower” or unnecessarily damaging Sino-foreign trade relations. 
3. Gaps in Scholarly/Policy Research 
China’s government claims to have a robust regime of product safety laws 
designed to protect both international and domestic consumer, especially in the area of 
food safety; however, consumer product safety lapses continue to tarnish the “Made in 
China” brand.28 Despite the central government’s apparently sincere desire to reform and 
strengthen the consumer product safety regime, its efforts are often thwarted by local, 
provincial, and occasionally corrupt national officials. Part of the problem is that local 
and provincial Chinese Communist Party administrators are promoted on the basis of 
                                                 
26 Barboza, "China Acts to Cleanse Reputation." – “Chinese regulators have rejected imports of 
American meat, Indonesian seafood and other products from the Philippines, South Korea, Germany, 
France and Spain, saying those countries shipped shoddy or tainted goods.” 
27 Wang Xiangwei, "Product Safety Flap Has Upside for Mainlanders," South China Morning Post 27 
August 2007. – “The international concerns have spread to tainted toys, toothpaste and seafood and faulty 
(tyres) [tires], although the substandard products should account for a tiny portion of the U.S. $1 trillion in 
exports. Indeed, officials have said that the qualification rate for exported food products had been over 99 
per cent for many years.” DeWoskin, "The 'Made in China' Stigma Shock," 10. – “In mid August [2007] 
the [Chinese] State Council issued a “White Paper on Food Quality and Safety.” In defense of China’s food 
export record, it notes that even Japan rated China’s exports as the most highly acceptable among all of its 
imported foods. Even though Japan conducted more sample surveys on Chinese food than that from 
anywhere else, it had the highest acceptance rate at 99.42%. In 2006 and the first half of 2007, the 
acceptance rate of Chinese food shipments to the U.S. was 99.2% and 99.1%, respectively. In the case of 
the EU, the figures were 99.9% and 99.8%, respectively.”  
28 China's State Council Information Office, "White Paper on Food Quality and Safety," Xinhua, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2007-08/18/content_6032837.htm. (accessed September 2008). 
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how well their region performs economically. Furthermore, many local and provincial 
administrators also have a vested financial interest in the companies that they are 
responsible for supervising. Hence, many local and provincial officials fall prey to 
corruption and self-interest and overlook or ignore issues of consumer product safety. 
In spite of a comprehensive review of both the consensus and the debate 
surrounding China’s product safety, a comprehensive policy to improve China’s product 
safety regulatory regime also requires research in the following areas: a comparative 
study of post-economic reform China and pre-quality revolution Japan (circa 1950s) and 
an analysis for the implementation of common international standards (e.g., ISO 9000 
and ISO 22000) in large Chinese export-focused companies.  
Similar to China, Japan suffered product quality and safety concerns as it emerged 
as an international exporter in the post-World War II period. In the 1950s, “Made in 
Japan” has in the past had the same negative connotations as “Made in China” has in 
some sectors of the economy today. Although a comparative study of the two countries 
may yield some significant differences based upon forms of government, paths to 
economic development, and advances in technology between the 1950s and the 21st 
century, a comparative study of the two countries and their respective consumer product 
safety regime could also yield useful lessons for China today.29   
Meanwhile, in the spirit of quality improvement for the sake of product safety and 
process control, China should perform an analysis to determine the effects of 
implementing common international standards on export-focused Chinese companies. 
These companies can assist in the restoration of the “Made in China” label by adopting 
the following practices: supply chain management, quality assurance standards, employee 
                                                 
29 DeWoskin, "The 'Made in China' Stigma Shock," 9-10. – “Early in its postwar redevelopment, when 
the quality of Japanese goods was not highly regarded in key export markets, Tokyo famously invited W. 
Edwards Deming to lecture on quality. His appearances in 1950 were immediately followed with a widely 
publicized national commitment to address the quality challenge head-on. In the next decade, Japan trained 
20,000 engineers in statistical quality control. The results were real and tangible. Rebranding “Made in 
Japan” to mean reliable quality enable the country’s companies to gain global market leadership in high-
value products from cameras to electronics to automobiles. At the peak of its achievement, Japan’s quality 
campaign even propelled Japanese manufacturing systems, the well-known quality circles, into the global 
spotlight. Not only, Japanese goods themselves but the processes of Japanese companies became the envy 
of the world.” 
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training on product safety requirements, and a sense of corporate accountability. An 
immediate impact on each of these areas would result if Chinese food producers 
implemented International Standard for Organization (ISO) 22000, which are a new 
International Standard aimed at guaranteeing the safety of “food supply chains 
worldwide” and the first of a number of management systems aimed at strengthening the 
quality and control of international food production and distribution.30 Adoption of this 
standard would provide international consumers with a clear standard.31 As a result, 
China could ensure the safety and quality of food for both the domestic and export 
market. 
In summary, the areas that require additional research to recommend 
improvements to China’s consumer product safety regime consist of the following: 
• A study of the principal-agent relationship between local Chinese 
Communist Party officials and the companies that they are charged with 
supervising. 
• A comparative study of quality control and product safety regimes 
between pre-quality revolution Japan and post-economic reform China. 
• An analysis for the implementation of common international standards in 
China’s export-focused companies.  
C. HYPOTHESIS 
We now turn to the hypothesis that flows from the preceding scholarly/policy 
review and from the initial research question (which asked: How should the Chinese 
government respond in order to improve China’s consumer product safety regime with 
respect to food and drugs, so that the Chinese government can protect the country’s 
export driven economic growth and a large multinational body of consumers?) 
                                                 
30 Roger Frost, "I.S.O. 22000 Is First in Family of Food Safety Management System Standards," ISO 
Management Systems  (November-December 2005): 16. 
31 Frost, "I.S.O. 22000 Is First in Family of Food Safety Management System Standards," 18. 
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1. Hypothesis Statement 32 
It is the hypothesis, or argument, of this thesis that China can improve its product 
safety regulatory regime through revised laws, improved law enforcement, enhanced 
domestic regulatory agency cooperation, and the adoption of international product safety 
regulations (ISO 22000). It also needs to implement lessons from developed nations (the 
United States and Japan), expand international cooperation on product safety regulation, 
and improve public relations with consumers, international businesses, and the media. 
Additionally, a line should be drawn between feasible and idealistic solutions, affordable 
and prohibitively expensive solutions, and finally short-term and long-term solutions.  
a. Primary Hypothesis  
As China’s consumer product safety regime improves, China’s export 
market for food and drug products will increase. 
b. Subordinate Hypothesis 
Revision and improvement in China’s domestic product safety regulatory 
regime – laws, law enforcement, and domestic interagency cooperation – in addition to 
the adoption of international consumer product safety best practices for developing 
countries provide China with a short-term, affordable, and feasible solution to improve its 
product safety regulatory regime.  
2. Policy Questions 
How should the Chinese government respond in order to improve China’s 
consumer product safety regime with respect to food and drugs, so that the Chinese 
government can protect the country’s export driven economic growth and a large 
multinational body of consumers?” 
                                                 
32 Stephen Van-Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1997), 9. – Van-Evera defines, “A hypothesis is a conjectured relationship between two 
phenomena. Like laws, hypotheses can be two types: causal (“I surmise that A causes B”) and noncausal 
(“I surmise that A and B are caused by C; hence A and B are correlated but neither causes the other”).” 
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3. Policy Statement 
China’s central government can improve their food and drug consumer product 
safety regulatory and enforcement regime through the following actions: 
• Revise laws.  
• Improve law enforcement.  
• Improve interagency cooperation among domestic regulatory and 
enforcement agencies. 
• Expand interagency cooperation with the United States, the European 
Union, and Japan. 
• Adopt international standards for quality and product safety (e.g., ISO 
22000). 
• Implement appropriate lessons from other nations, such as Japan, that 
overcame product quality and safety issues. 
• Permit greater media coverage that can assist in exposing non-compliant 
government officials and businessmen. 
• Improve domestic and international public relations on product safety 
issues by publicizing China’s changes to the product safety regime and 
citing favorable statistics. 
• Resolve protectionism by cooperating with the United States and other 
nations to improve the acceptance rate of products on both sides of the 
trade relationship.  
• Implementing a combination of these institutions and practices at the 
domestic and international level will permit China to protect its economic 
growth and its international consumer market from food and drugs that 


















The methodology followed to develop the hypothesis involves a straight-forward 
policy analysis approach. This entails looking at the problem in context and the 
evaluation of several alternative solutions to the problem. Meanwhile, the intended 




                                                 
33 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving, Second ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, a Division of Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 
2005), xiii. – “…the subject matter [of policy analysis] concerns the lives and well-being of large numbers 
of fellow citizens.” 
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Furthermore, the hypothesis as the term is used here is grounded in a methodology that 
can perform the following functions: program evaluation, program design, program 
management, and public relations.34 
2. Subset Analysis 
A comparative analysis and a cost-benefit analysis will also be used to support the 
further development of two critical points recommended in the hypothesis.  
First, comparative analysis will address the development of product quality and 
safety regimes by evaluating the pre-quality revolution in post-1945 Japan and post-
economic reform China. The analysis will provide a reference point that can guide China 
in developing best-practices for developing product safety and quality. Despite 
differences in both forms of government and paths to economic development, Japan, 
which is renowned for the outstanding product quality of its manufactured goods, serves 
3as a good case study for product quality and safety improvement in China.35  
A cost-benefit analysis, meanwhile, will assist in determining the practicality of 
implementing international standards, such as ISO 22000, in Chinese export-focused 
companies. International standards provide auditable standards with clear requirements 
that would improve the safety and quality of food and drug products produced in China; 
however, these systems are complex and costly to implement.36 A cost-benefit analysis 
permits Chinese officials to evaluate which Chinese companies should implement the 
system based upon product safety requirements and the value added by ISO 22000. 
Comparative analysis and cost-benefit analysis constitute a minor role in the development 
of the hypothesis; therefore, the remainder of the discussion of methodology will 
concentrate on policy analysis.  
                                                 
34 Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem 
Solving, xiii. - “Policy (analysts) [analysis] help[s] in planning, budgeting, program evaluation, program 
design, program management, public relations, and other functions.” 
35 DeWoskin, "The 'Made in China' Stigma Shock," 9-10. 
36 Frost, "I.S.O. 22000 Is First in Family of Food Safety Management System Standards," 18. 
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3. Policy Analysis 
Since product safety concerns in China are a contemporary issue with sparce 
academic research, analysis of the subject and policy recommendations will be drawn 
from academic conferences, government agencies, journal articles, and newspaper 
articles. 
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II. BEIJING SHOULD CLEAN HOUSE (FORMAL/INTERNAL 
RESPONSE) 
A. OVERVIEW FOR A FORMAL/INTERNAL RESPONSE 
In order to protect the “Made in China” brand from further damage, the Chinese 
central government continues to respond with a range of new institutions and practices: 
new laws to regulate the production and recall of consumer products, a vigorous effort to 
enforce new and existing consumer product laws, and intensified inspections to ensure 
the quality of goods for both export and domestic consumption.  
1. Revise Laws and Improve Internal Interagency Cooperation 
In July 2007, the Chinese central government appointed Vice Premier Wu Yi, 
who skillfully handled the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 
2003, as head of a food safety and product quality task force aimed at restoring China’s 
brand image.37 The product quality task force represented an initial attempt to both focus 
the Chinese government’s attention on the critical issue of product safety and improve 
poor internal interagency cooperation among China’s product safety regulatory agencies. 
On July 27 2007, the Chinese National Quality Control Conference (attended by party 
officials and representatives from the country’s product safety regulatory agencies) in 
Beijing defined many of the requirements that Wu Yi should fulfill over the next few 
months.38 On August 31 2007, Wu Yi, the “Iron Lady,” succinctly described her purpose  
 
                                                 
37 "Product-Quality Scandals Persist." 
38 "China's Wen Jiabao, Wu Yi Address National Conference on Product Safety." – “Wen Jiabao, 
[member of the CCP Central Committee Political Bureau Standing Committee and premiere of the State 
Council], pointed out: Product quality has a close bearing on the people’s vital interests, on businesses’ 
survival and development, and on the image of the country.” Furthermore, “Wen Jiabao put forth the 
following six requirements to be met today and in the days to come: (1) Tightening up quality control in all 
areas… (2) Speeding up the formulation of standards for product quality… (3) Improving product quality 
from the source… (4) Formulating stronger laws for ensuring product quality… (5) Pooling efforts to 
launch a special drive to control product quality… (6) Tightening up the management of public opinion and 
information.” 
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and the mission of her task force in the following terms: “This is a special war to protect 
the safety and interests of the general public, as well as a war to safeguard the ‘Made in 
China’ label and the country’s image.”39  
In clear indication of support for Wu Yi’s statement, the General Administration 
of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) for the People’s Republic of 
China announced the first recall system for unsafe food and toys the same day.40 AQSIQ 
is responsible for all products produced in China for both domestic and international 
markets.41 According to CNN, “[The new regulations] require manufacturers to stop 
production and sales, notify vendors and customers, and report to quality control 
authorities when defects are found.”42 The recall system also requires food producers to 
“voluntarily recall any potentially harmful products and investigate immediately.”43 If the 
food producer fails to take the appropriate action or a food incident occurs, then the 
administration will force a recall and issue a consumer safety alert.44  
In addition to the recall system, the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) expanded 
food labeling requirements and directed the establishment of a new food-tracking and 
monitoring system, initially to support food safety during the 2008 Olympics.45 In 
support of the recall and food monitoring systems, the central government reports that it 
plans to spend approximately $1.1 billion dollars by 2010 to strengthen supervisory 
capacity in relation to food and drug safety.46 This revamped food monitoring system 
should improve food safety for major cities in China and for export markets. Both 
systems are an important first step in the development of a product safety regime 
                                                 
39 Barboza, "China Acts to Cleanse Reputation." 
40 "Beijing Launches Massive Checkup for Product Quality, Food Safety." 
41 CNN Money, "China Starts Recall System for Food, Toys," CNN, 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/31/news/international/china_recall.ap/index.htm?section=money_topstories. 
(accessed September 2008). 
42 CNN Money, "China Starts Recall System for Food, Toys." 
43 CNN Money, "China Starts Recall System for Food, Toys." 
44 CNN Money, "China Starts Recall System for Food, Toys." 
45 "Product-Quality Scandals Persist." 
46 Barboza, "China Acts to Cleanse Reputation." 
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designed to protect China’s international reputation as a manufacturer; however, these 
laws will mean little if they are not enforced routinely and at all levels of the Chinese 
government.  
2. Improve Law Enforcement 
New laws are not easily enforced in China. According to The Economist, 
“Unhealthy links between government and business, combined with patchy 
implementation of rules and regulations mean that China has a political culture that will 
be hard to transform quickly.”47 Regulatory agencies are often understaffed and 
susceptible to corruption at the local level. Even with intense effort, it will be very 
challenging for poorly staffed regulatory enforcement bodies to monitor China’s small 
vendors and food suppliers who have been mandated to comply with the country’s new 
food recall and monitoring systems.48 
However, in recent months regulators from agencies, like China’s State Food and 
Drug Administration, have reportedly disrupted numerous counterfeit pharmaceutical 
businesses that produced products ranging from fake bird flu vaccine to fake Viagra.49 In 
addition to the drug industry, Chinese regulators have also severely scrutinized farmers, 
grocers, restaurants, and other businesses in the food production supply chain.50 As an 
example of China’s effort to improve their food quality through inspection and 
enforcement, a recent Congressional Research Service report notes that China conducted 
10.4 million inspections that closed 152,000 unlicensed food businesses.51 
                                                 
47 "Stoking Protectionism: Substandard Exports from China Provoke Protectionist Responses." 
48 Cary Huang, "Number of Food Processors to Pose Challenge for Recall Plan, Says Official," South 
China Morning Post 28 August 2007. 
49 Barboza, "China Acts to Cleanse Reputation." 
50 David Barboza, "China in Public Relations Offensive for Products," The International Herald 
Tribune 6 September 2007. 
51 Morrison, "Health and Safety Concerns over U.S. Imports of Chinese Products: An Overview," 4. 
Morrison notes: “In June 2007, the China Daily reported that a nationwide inspection of the food 
production industry had found that a variety of dangerous raw materials had been used in the production of 
flour, candy, pickles, biscuits, black fungus, melon seeds, bean curd, and seafood. As a result, the 
government reportedly closed 180 food factories found to be producing unsafe products and/or making fake 
commodities. It also reported that in 2006, the government had conducted 10.4 million inspections, 
uncovering problems in 360,000 food businesses and had closed 152,000 unlicensed food businesses.” 
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In the past China’s central government has passed laws to appease international 
concerns on many issues ranging from intellectual property rights to environmental 
protection. However, there was little or no actual enforcement of these at the local level. 
Will China’s product safety laws suffer the same fate? According to BusinessWeek, 
“Political corruption and lax regulatory oversight have caused health problems and even 
deaths inside China.”52 However, it appears that, in the context of the latest round of 
scandals and the holding of the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, the modes of governance and 
business that caused these problems may actually be beginning to change. In the arena of 
consumer product safety, the central government is adamant that it will no longer tolerate 
corruption or lack of oversight by local and regional authorities.53 During a media 
briefing in late August of 2007, Kuang Weilin, China’s deputy consul general in New 
York stated that there would be “zero tolerance for violators or government officials who 
fail to perform their duties.”54 As a testament to the central government’s commitment to 
enforcement, on July 10 2007 BusinessWeek reported that Zheng Xiaoyu, the former 
commissioner of the country’s State Food and Drug Administration, “was executed 
(Figure 2) for accepting bribes of about $850,000 from eight drug companies seeking 
quick product approval.”55 Clearly, the harsh sentence for Zheng Xiaoyu’s crimes was 
intended to send a signal to both local officials and the international community that the 
Chinese central government was fully committed to addressing the current consumer 
product safety crisis through enforcement of the law.  
                                                 
52 Brian Bremner, "Paulson's China Charm Offensive," BusinessWeek Online, 
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jul2007/gb20070731_552927.htm?chan=search. (accessed 
September 2008). 
53 John Gapper, "China Pledges to Raise Safety Standards," Financial Times 31 August 2007. 
54 Gapper, "China Pledges to Raise Safety Standards." 
55 Bremner, "Paulson's China Charm Offensive." 
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Figure 2.   New York Times: “Zheng Xiaoyu, the former director of China’s State Food 
and Drug Administration, was executed July 10 [, 2007,] for approving untested 
medicine in exchange for cash. He became the highest-ranking Chinese official 
ever put to death.56 
 
 
B. REVISION OF CHINA’S CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY LAWS 
Which laws currently protect food and drug consumers from the negligence of 
numerous enterprises and which laws need to be revised? 
                                                 
56 "Director of China's State Food and Drug Administration Executed," New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2007/07/12/business/13corrupt.1.ready.html. (accessed September 
2008). 
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1. China’s Current Consumer Product Safety Laws, Regulations, and 
Rules for Food, Drugs, and Other Items 
a. China’s Consumer Product Safety Laws 
In response to a wake of product quality scandals in early 2007, China’s 
State Council published a “White Paper on Food Quality and Safety.” According to the 
White Paper, “China now has a complete law regime providing a sound foundation and 
good environment guaranteeing food safety, improving food quality and regulating food 
imports and exports.”57 Table 1 addresses specific laws that support product quality in 
China. 
Table 1.   Product Quality Laws in China.58 
Product Quality Laws in China 
Product Quality Law 
Standardization Law 
Metrology Law 
Law on the Protection of Consume Rights and Interests 
Law on Quality and Safety of Agricultural Products 
Criminal Law 
Food Hygiene Law 
Law on Import and Export Commodity Inspection 
Law on Animal and Plant Entry and Exit Quarantine 
Frontier Health and Quarantine Law 
Law on Animal and Disease Prevention 
 
 
                                                 
57 China's State Council Information Office, "White Paper on Food Quality and Safety." 
58 China's State Council Information Office, "White Paper on Food Quality and Safety." The White 
Paper notes China’s Product Quality Laws: “China now has a complete law regime providing a sound 
foundation and good environment for guaranteeing food safety, improving food quality and regulating food 
imports and exports. The specific laws in this regard include the Product Quality Law, Standardization 
Law, Metrology Law, Law on the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests, Law on the Quality and 
Safety of Agricultural Products, Criminal Law, Food Hygiene Law, Law on Import and Export Commodity 
Inspection, Law on Animal and Plant Entry and Exit Quarantine, Frontier Health and Quarantine Law and 
Law on Animal and Disease Prevention.” 
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The laws specified in the White Paper run parallel to laws present in mature 
industrialized economies; however, enforcement of these laws in the face of widespread 
corporate and judicial corruption work against the central governments efforts to promote 
product safety.  
b. China’s Consumer Product Safety Regulations 
In addition to a robust set of laws, China’s central government has 
instituted specific administrative regulations to the product safety of Chinese made 
goods. In addition to laws the White Paper also highlights specific product quality 
regulations designed to protect consumers. Table 2 provides an overview of specific 
















Table 2.   Product Quality Regulations in China.59 
Product Quality Regulations in China 
Special Regulations of the State Council on Strengthening Safety Supervision and 
Administration of Food and Other Products 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Production 
Licenses for Industrial Products 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Certification and Accreditation 
Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Animal and Plant Entry and Exit Quarantine 
Administrative Regulations of the People’s Republic of China of Veterinary Medicine 
Administrative Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Pesticides 
Provisions of the People’s Republic of China on Place of Origin of Export Goods 
Regulations for the Implementation of the Standardization Law of the People’s Republic 
of China 
Measures for Investigating, Punishing and Banning Unlicensed Business Operations 
Regulations on the Administration of Feedstuffs and Feed Additives 
Administrative Regulations on the Safety of Genetically Modified Agriculatural 
Organisms 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Import and Export of Endangered Wild 
Fauna and Flora 
 
Again, these regulations appear to be both detailed and adequate; however, as is the case 
with the laws discussed above, there is a lack of enforcement that continues to undermine 
product safety. 
                                                 
59 China's State Council Information Office, "White Paper on Food Quality and Safety." The White 
Paper notes the following product safety regulations in China: “The specific administrative regulations in 
this regard include the Special Regulations of the State Council on Strengthening Safety Supervision and 
Administration of Food and Other Products, Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Administration of Production Licenses for Industrial Products, Regulations of the People’s Republic of 
China on Certification and Accreditation, Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on Animal and Plant Entry and Exit Quarantine, Administrative Regulations of the 
People’s Republic of China on Veterinary Medicine, Administrative Regulations of the People’s Republic 
of China on Pesticides, Provisions of the People’s Republic of China on Place of Origin of Export Goods, 
Regulations for the Implementation of the Standardization Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
Measures for Investigating, Punishing and Banning Unlicensed Business Operations, Regulations on the 
Administration of Feedstuffs and Feed Additives, Administrative Regulations on the Safety of Genetically 
Modified Agricultural Organisms and Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Import and Export 
of Endangered Wild Fauna and Flora.” 
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c. China’s Consumer Product Safety Rules 
As with laws and regulations, various departments within the central 
government have implemented rules to protect consumers and China’s brand name. In 
order to further protect consumers, various departments have implemented rules as well. 
Table 3 provides a brief overview of various departmental rules that China exercised to 
ensure quality. 
Table 3.   China’s Departmental Rules on Product Quality.60 
China’s Departmental Rules on Product Quality 
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Measures for the Administration of the 
Supervision of Quality and Safety of Food Producing and Processing Enterprises (Trial) 
Measures for the Implementation of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China 
for the Administration of Production Licenses for Industrial Products 
Measures for the Administration of Food Hygiene Licenses 
Measures for the Hygiene Administration of Food Additives 
Measures for the Administration of Inspection and Quarantine of Entry and Exit Meat 
Products 
Measures for the Administration of Inspection and Quarantine of Entry and Exit of 
Aquatic Products 
Measures for the Administration of Food Safety in the Circulation Sector 
Measures for the Administration of the Safety of Places of Origin of Agricultural 
Products 
Measures for the Administration of the Packaging and Marks of Agricultural Products 
Regulations for the Administration of Hygiene 
Registration of Export Food Production Enterprises 
 
                                                 
60 China's State Council Information Office, "White Paper on Food Quality and Safety." The White 
Paper annotates the following departmental rules: “The specific departmental rules include the Detailed 
Rules for the Implementation of the Measures for the Administration of the Supervision of Quality and 
Safety of Food of Food Producing and Processing Enterprises (Trial), Measures for the Implementation of 
the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China for the Administration of Production Licenses for 
Industrial Products, Measures for the China for the Administration of Production Licenses for Industrial 
Products. Measures for the Administration of Food Hygiene Licenses, Measures for the Hygiene 
Administration of Food Additives, Measures for the Administration of Inspection and Quarantine of Entry 
and Exit Meat Products, Measures for the Administration of Inspection and Quarantine of Entry and Exit of 
Aquatic Products, Measures for the Administration of Food Safety in the Circulation Sector, Measures for 
the Administration of the Safety of Places of Origin of Agricultural Products, Measures for the 
Administration of the Safety of Places of Origin of Agricultural Products, Measures for the Administration 
of the Packaging and Marks of Agricultural Products, Regulations for the Administration of Hygiene, and 
the Registration of Export Food Production Enterprises.” 
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Ultimately a plethora of rules, laws, and regulations, which ostensibly are 
aimed at protecting domestic and international consumers from dangerous products, 
come up against the major obstacles of enforcement and monitoring, as well as the 
corruption prevalent among provincial and local officials.  
2. Revisions to China’s Consumer Product Safety Laws for Food 
a. China’s Food Recall Law 
In the wake of the 2007 product safety scandals involving pet food that 
contained melamine and the distribution of contaminated toothpaste, China established a 
food recall system. The Chinese General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine established a recall system for food and toys based upon an 
earlier (2005) recall system established in China for defective vehicles.61 The new recall 
system requires producers to halt production and notify retailers and customers of any 
product defects.62 If the producer fails to act in a timely or accurate manner then the 
government will issue a consumer alert and mandate a recall of the defective product or 
non-compliant food.63 The food recall system mandated a basic recall system that has the 
potential to protect domestic and international consumers from inadvertent or deliberate 
lapses in the quality control of food.  
3.  Conclusion: China’s Product Safety Laws for Food 
With respect to laws, the Chinese government formally mandates provisions 
similar to those of the United States and Japan, yet China continues to be plagued by 
                                                 
61 CNN Money, "China Starts Recall System for Food, Toys." 
62 CNN Money, "China Starts Recall System for Food, Toys." CNN Money explained the mechanics 
of the recall system: “[The food and toy recall system] requires manufacturers to stop production and sales, 
notify vendors and customers, and report to quality control authorities when defects are found. The 
[General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine] oversees all products made in 
China and the measure appears to be targeted at goods manufactured for both domestic and global 
consumption. The administration said food producers should voluntarily recall any potentially harmful 
products and investigate immediately. It will force a recall and issue a consumer alert if manufacturers fail 
to take actions or if a food safety incident occurs.” 
63 CNN Money, "China Starts Recall System for Food, Toys." 
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embarrassing safety issues with respect to food and other items. Laws only offer a small 
portion of the solutions to China’s product safety fiasco. The core of the solution lies in 
actually establishing the rule of law, not just passing laws, and more particularly in 
significantly reducing corruption at the local level.64 
C. IMPROVE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND REDUCE CORRUPTION WITH 
RESPECT TO CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 
Strengthening law enforcement at the local level with respect to product safety is 
difficult for a myriad of factors. Many officials charged with enforcing product safety 
laws fail to actually do so because of a conflict of interest between their own direct or 
indirect compensation by the producers of the food or drugs on the one hand and 
compliance with the law on the other hand. Additionally, individual workers that report 
unsafe production practices, contamination, or others problems can face harsh social and 
economic consequences; therefore, few “whistleblowers” exist in China.65 Finally, 
China’s nascent judicial system offers little in the way of institutionalized processes or 
lawyers that have the ability to hold Chinese food producers accountable for infractions 
of the laws in a domestic or international context. 
China’s laws do not permit manufacturers to use dangerous chemicals or bypass 
critical quality assurance measures; however, many Chinese officials fail to enforce the 
current laws with respect to product safety. The lack of the rule of law in China 
undermines market forces through corruption, cronyism, and governmental 
connections.66 This opaque business environment prevents natural economic behavior 
                                                 
64 Wayne M. Morrison,  September 18, 2008. 
65 Peter Navarro, The Coming China Wars : Where They Will Be Fought and How They Can Be Won, 
Rev. and expanded ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: FT Press, 2008), 38. 
66 Morrison.  Morrison explains absence of the rule of law and it potential consequences for China: 
“The lack of the rule of law in China has led to widespread government corruption, financial speculation, 
and misallocation of investment funds. In many cases, government “connections,” not market forces, are 
the main determinant of successful firms in China. Many U.S. firms find it difficult to do business in China 
because rules and regulations are generally not consistent or transparent, contracts are not easily enforced, 
and intellectual property rights are not protected (due to the lack of an independent judicial system). The 
lack of the rule of law in China limits competition and undermines the efficient allocation of goods and 
services in the economy.” 
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from taking root in China and foreign companies find it very difficult to operate within 
China’s complex business terrain.67 Morrison highlights the impact that the lack of the 
rule of law has on the Chinese economy. If China remains unable to enforce its laws, then 
the legal revision of China’s product safety regime will not lead to any improvement in 
the standard of goods produced or a change for the better in the perception of products 
“Made in China.” 
1. Problems with China’s Law Enforcement with Respect to Consumer 
Product Safety 
a. Corrupt Relationships between Businesses and Local 
Government Officials in China 
In many cases, lapses in food and drug product safety can be traced to 
illicit relations between Chinese government officials and influential business leaders 
within the community. In some cases, Chinese government officials even hold interest in 
companies that they are supposed to regulate. In either case, collusion between 
government official and business leaders has the potential to lead both deliberate and 
inadvertent lapses in products safety for food and drugs.  
Government officials, especially at the local and provincial levels, are apt 
to use their position of power to enhance their personal wealth at the cost of the public 
good. As Lord explains: 
There is systemic corruption throughout China’s bureaucracies. 
Government officials appear to use their positions as an opportunity to 
make as much money as possible during the time they hold the position 
and get out before any wrongdoing is discovered. Long-term thinking 
seems to be sacrificed in modern China where those who are able to make 
short-term riches are idolized. Who wants to work his whole life when 
corruption offers a shortcut?68 
                                                 
67 Morrison. 
68 James Vincent Lord, 10 Steps to Success: The Essential Guide for Buying from China's 
Manufacturers (New York, NY: Guru Series, 2007), 58. 
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Additionally, even if there are honest local Chinese government officials they remain 
hampered by corrupt practices that are taking place around them, about which they may 
or may not be aware. Local officials are often co-opted by powerful local special interests 
in business, and local unrest directed at local officials based on corrupt practices 
generated by powerful local businesses further weakens and destabilizes local officials’ 
ability to rule.69 Corruption in China can undermine economic growth, political stability, 
and the safety of consumers that depend upon Chinese produced items, specifically food 
and drugs.  
In cases where a Chinese government official owns an interest in a 
company that he is also required to regulate, the conflict of interest is obvious. On one 
hand, the government official has a responsibility to ensure the public’s safety through 
the enforcement of laws and regulations that govern Chinese companies. On the other 
hand, the same government official has an interest in maximizing the profits of the 
Chinese companies in which he is a stakeholder. Additionally, promotion up the ranks of 
the Chinese Communist Party is often tied to the vigorous economic performance of a 
particular region where the official works. The economic incentives and possibilities of 
promotion for Chinese government officials encourages them to cooperate and collude 
with business leaders and far outweighs their formal role to regulate unsafe 
manufacturing outputs to the domestic and international market. Thus, although 
                                                 
69 James Kynge, China Shakes the World : A Titan's Rise and Troubled Future-- and the Challenge for 
America, 1st Mariner Books ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2007), 202. Kynge explains: “Local 
governments in many parts of the country have been hijacked by special interest syndicates that typically 
consist of government officials and the most influential business leaders. These secret syndicates exist to 
enrich their members, often at the expense of the public, and so they are implacably opposed to any reform 
that could unravel the web of relationships that boost their bank balances. No one knows how prevalent 
these syndicates may be, but a surge in the number of public protests directed at local governments 
suggests a sharply deteriorating situation. The number of “mass incidents” – the Ministry of Public 
Security’s catchall term for sit-ins, strikes, group petitions, rallies, demonstrations, marches, traffic-
blocking, building seizures, and other forms of unrest – reached 74,000 in 2004, an all-time high, and 
involved 3.7 million individuals. In 1994, by comparison, there were about 10,000 such incidents, with just 
730,000 participants. In 2005 the numbers continued to rise. Although no “mass incidents” have escalated 
into coordinated, nationwide movements, the dramatic increase in local protests shows that material 
enrichment alone does not guarantee greater public contentment. In fact, the outbreaks have grown in 
recent years at roughly the same rate as the economy – that is to say, around 9 percent. In the 
overwhelming majority of cases, the flare-ups have been sparked by the arbitrary behavior of local 
government officials who seize land and other assets from ordinary citizens but offer little or no 
compensation.” 
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corruption among government officials and business managers poses a dangerous threat 
to China’s consumer product safety regime, corruption continues to occur at all levels of 
the production process and throughout the supply chain.  
b. Corrupt Workers Impact Efforts to Enhance Product Safety in 
China 
Even when government officials and a firm’s management attempt to 
control product quality within the guidelines and regulations established by the Chinese 
government, key workers within the firm still have ample ability and incentive to accept 
bribes in return for accepting sub-standard or tainted raw materials for the making of food 
or drugs. More often than not, these lapses may go unnoticed throughout the supply 
chain. The consumer may actually use the drug or consume the food product with no 
immediate side effects that might hint at the products contamination. Lord notes that 
audits and quality inspections are often thwarted at very low-levels within Chinese 
firms.70 Income disparity and greed provide the most likely reasons for corruption at this 
level within Chinese firms. Neither condition yields an easy or all-encompassing solution 
that would dissuade corrupt practices by employees charged with quality control or 
auditing within a company. 
c. The Whistleblower’s Dilemma in China 
Whistleblowers in China that disclose corruption or dangerous 
manufacturing processes in an effort to prevent lapses in product safety are often 
                                                 
70 Lord, 10 Steps to Success: The Essential Guide for Buying from China's Manufacturers, 59-60. 
Lord notes: “Corrupt practices pervade product quality inspections. Quality inspectors are routinely paid a 
month’s wage or sufficiently “entertained” to pass an inspection that might otherwise fail, particularly on 
borderline cases. Indeed, dishonest quality inspectors are only too pleased to come across or create 
borderline quality issues. These problems are not so bad that passing them would later put themselves at 
high-risk, yet ambiguous enough to use as leverage to extort a “red pocket” from a manufacturer facing 
penalties for late shipment. [Alternatively,] factories are required to pass a Factory Audit to manufacture 
and export to many of the major retailers. The auditors that conduct these factory audits can make it more 
difficult than necessary to pass the audit; that is, until adequate “encouragement” is provided. I am certainly 
not saying that all inspectors and auditors are dishonest, only that such practice regularly occurs. Inspection 
and auditing companies are in constant battle to update their procedures and rotate staff to remain credible 
and continue to provide a quality service. For our purposes, it is necessary to be aware that corruption is all-
pervasive in China – from large sums of money changing hands on huge projects, to small-scale illicit 
endeavors at the lowest levels and smallest recesses within companies.” 
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subjected to imprisonment, economic retaliation, or physical injury at the hands of local 
government officials, firm managers, and even their co-workers. In their book, Will the 
Boat Sink the Water?, Chen and Wu recount four horrific incidents in which individuals 
attempted to stand-up to local injustices only to be met with ridicule, alienation, 
incarceration, and even death.71 Navarro illustrates three cases first reported in the 
Financial Times where whistleblowers suffered based upon their reports of corruption 
and misdeeds perpetrated by their firms.72 Unlike the United States, China does not have 
whistleblower protection laws that prevent employers or the government from retaliating 
against individuals who expose wrongdoing, product safety negligence, or corruption.73 
As Wang Hai, a Chinese consumer rights advocate notes, “If you want to have a good 
system of consumer protection, protecting whistleblowers is an essential requirement.” 
d. Lack of Rule of Law in China Hampers Enforcement of Product 
Safety Laws 
China retains a nascent, yet budding, judicial and corporate governance 
system. Many international companies experience frustration in a Chinese business 
environment that fails to enforce contracts and product safety laws. The lack of rule of 
law in China fosters government corruption and retards enforcement of laws designed to 
protect consumers, investors, and private companies. In order to promote economic 
development and protect consumers from product safety lapses, China must establish an 
independent judiciary that is not beholden to political elites at the local and national 
                                                 
71 Guidi Chen and Chuntao, Will the Boat Sink the Water?: The Life of China's Peasants, 1st ed. (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2006), 1-224. 
72 Navarro, The Coming China Wars : Where They Will Be Fought and How They Can Be Won, 38-39.  
Navarro cites three whistleblower cases in China: “The first whistleblower, Dr. Tang Zhixiong, accused his 
fellow doctors of conducting unethical transplant surgeries. In addition, Ms. Zhou Huanxi and Mr. Shi 
Yuefu each separately denounced their former companies for producing fake medicines. Dr. Tang is now 
on the run after receiving violent threats, and he fears arrest on trumped up charges. Dr. Tang’s fear of 
arrest is hardly unfounded. After Ms. Zhou revealed that a tonic being marketed to pregnant women as a 
health enhancer was nothing but snake oil, she was arrested on phony charge of blackmail and jailed for 
almost four years. Meanwhile, Mr. Shi was not quite as “lucky” as Dr. Tang and Ms. Zhou. He was run 
over by a van with a bogus license plate and left with serious brain injuries.” 




levels of the Chinese Communist Party. Furthermore, China has too few lawyers to 
implement laws to protect consumers, investors, or companies.74 In order for Chinese 
companies and local level Chinese Party Officials to place a premium on consumer 
product safety, then the rule of law must first exist in China.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE CHINA’S LAWS AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT WITH RESPECT TO CONSUMER PRODUCT 
SAFETY 
1. Consumer Product Safety Laws 
China possesses a relatively robust regulatory system with respect to consumer 
product safety, especially with respect to food producers. The Chinese government is 
weak with respect to specific laws that protect consumers, and it is also weak on 
enforcement of existing product safety regulations.75 Consumers have little recourse of 
action against Chinese companies that fail to comply with product safety standards 
because of a corrupt and interdependent judicial system. Additionally, China’s product 
safety enforcement agencies lack adequate manpower and funding to successfully 
implement existing regulatory requirements.76 
a. Recommendations 
• Expand funding/manpower and coordinate actions for the following 
Chinese consumer product safety enforcement agencies: 
• General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine 
• State Food and Drug Administration 
• Health Ministry 
• Agriculture Ministry 
                                                 
74 James A. Ogilvy, Peter Schwartz, and Joe Flower, China's Futures : Scenarios for the World's 
Fastest Growing Economy, Ecology, and Society, 1st ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000; reprint, 
Abstract), 1, 4. 
75 Morrison, "China-U.S. Trade Issues," 9. 
76 Morrison, "China-U.S. Trade Issues," 9. 
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• Commerce Ministry 
• State Administration of Industry and Commerce.77 
• Place well-educated and independent product safety regulators at the local 
level in order to conduct accurate assessments of each company’s 
compliance with product safety laws and regulations. Regulators must 
have direct report authority to their individual regulatory agencies at the 
state level in order to minimize conflicts of interest at the local level. 
• Establish an independent judicial system that permits consumers to take 
effective legal action against negligent Chinese companies. 
b. Barriers to Implementation 
Although the State Council produces additional regulations and laws, 
provincial, city, county, and township officials lack the incentives and oversight that are 
necessary to implement costly and burdensome product safety practices.  
First, China’s post-1978 economic reform led to a rent-seeking, 
decentralized authoritarian government.78 The State Council – central government – has 
little ability to enforce mandates on the local government.79 In fact, with each 
diminishing body within the hierarchical structure the balance of power shifts more from 




                                                 
77 John Vause, "CNN Special: Made in China, Part 1," in Made in China, ed. John Vause (CNN 
International, 2007). 
78 Kenneth Lieberthal, "Governing China : From Revolution through Reform,"  (2004): 189. 
79 Lieberthal, "Governing China : From Revolution through Reform," 180. Lieberthal notes: “The loss 
of ideological discipline, the officially sanctioned scramble for wealth, and resulting corruption have 
significantly eroded the leverage of the Center over activities of the provinces [, cities, counties, and 
townships]. Although Beijing remains important resources to bring provinces to heel, provincial leaders 
often evade orders that are not quite specific, or are not given high priority by the national leaders.” 
80 Lieberthal, "Governing China : From Revolution through Reform," 181. 
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Figure 3.   The Spectrum of Political Power and Influence in China.81 
 
 
Second, China’s producers are under enormous pressure from large multi-
national corporations, such as Wal-Mart, to reduce cost in an environment of increasing 
labor and material costs.82 Implementation of laws, regulations, and production standards 
would drive up the production costs for Chinese food and drug producers that already 
operate with very low margins. Increased production costs from quality control would 
                                                 
81 Lieberthal, "Governing China : From Revolution through Reform," 180-81. – Figure 3 developed 
from Lieberthal’s discussion on the hierarchy of China’s governmental structure.  
82 Chris Ansell, "Introduction: Holding China Accountable? Protecting Consumers in Global 
Markets," in 8th Annual Travers Conference on Ethics and Accountability in Government: Holding China 
Accountable? Protecting Consumers in Global Markets (University of California, Berkeley: October 10, 
2008), 8. Ansell notes: “Another factor contributing to the problem is cost-pressure on suppliers. Chinese 
imports are particularly sensitive to low quality, unsafe, or fraudulent products because price considerations 
are often the predominant consideration. In global food supply chains, buying organizations are typically 
large, vertically integrated multinational corporations that emphasize low cost. The “Wal-Mart” effect 
(huge buying power leading to cost-cutting pressures) and the increasing costs of production are seen as 
driving exporters to search for ways to use cheaper materials. The razor thin margins of Chinese 
manufacturers are regarded as creating a powerful incentive for production fraud. Chinese officials have 
even suggested that the problem comes in part from American companies who insist on low prices without 
clearly communicating their quality standards.” 
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inevitably cause producers to lose clients and profits, so producers have no tangible 
incentive to comply with the quality mandates of Beijing at the level of the firm. 
In summary, Beijing has to find a practical solution for the expansion the 
country’s quality control enforcement regime and to create market incentives that 
motivate producers to comply with product safety laws and regulations.   
c. Practical Recommendations 
In order to implement product safety laws and regulations established by 
the central government, the central government must develop incentives to garner the 
compliance of local officials and firms in the marketplace. First, a local official’s 
promotion should correlate to the official’s compliance with environmental regulations 
and product safety regulations while still maintaining robust economic growth within his 
or her province, county, city, or township. Admittedly, these three priorities require trade-
offs among each, yet efficient managers and politicians find a method for managing 
competing priorities when incentives are accurately aligned to the firm’s or country’s 
goals. Second, central government must provide economic benefits to those firms that can 
demonstrate product safety regulatory compliance through process controls and empirical 
evidence. Although neither of these solutions represent a clear and concise method for 
improving China’s ailing consumer product safety regime, each recommendation is 
feasible with the likelihood of tangible short-term results. 
2. Law Enforcement 
Enforcement of existing laws and regulations for product safety in China fail for 
two reasons. First, regulatory and enforcement agencies lack adequate manpower and 
resources to impose existing laws and regulations on Chinese producers.83 Second, local 
officials responsible for implementing laws and regulations often have a stake in insuring 
that local companies succeed financially. Local officials get promoted based upon their  
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territories economic prosperity – not compliance with product safety or environmental 
regulations. Additionally, some local officials partially own some of the companies that 
they are required to regulate.  
a. Recommendations 
• Reduce the principal-agent dilemma by eliminating ownership rights of 
any Chinese Communist Party Official that has a responsibility for 
regulating the aforementioned company. 
• Reward local Chinese Communist Party Officials for economic 
performance, product safety, and environmental compliance. Punish any 
official that violates product safety and environmental regulations. 
Severely punish any acts of corruption that result in illness or loss of life 
to domestic and international consumers.  
b. Barriers to Implementation 
Legal reforms fail to solve regulatory and product safety failures within 
China’s consumer product safety regime. Stanley Lubman of Boalt Law School notes that 
China’s legal institutions are “vague, incomplete, and weak.”84 A legal system did not 
exist in China prior to 1979, so it remains one of the weakest institutions in Chinese 
society.85 Corruption within China among business and government officials grew into 
an endemic problem that coincided with economic reforms that decentralized executive 
decision making within the government – specifically the Chinese Communist Party.86 
Broader and more detailed regulations remain an incomplete answer to product safety 
problems with Chinese producers.  
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Until incentives that reward efforts to improve product safety and reduce 
environmental impact exist, government official and producers will continue to focus 
upon economic incentives that result from economic margins that are increased through 
corruption, poor product quality, and pollution. China’s naïve form of capitalistic society 
continues to ignore the real strength of a free-market system: individuals maximize their 
own self-interest. This dogmatic fact has to be used in a manner that aligns the interest of 
the individual with the interest of the firm and the state in order to continue China’s 
growing economic prosperity.  
In summary, market incentives have to be aligned with individual 
incentives. Otherwise, government officials will not enforce the law, and producers will 
not obey the law.  
c. Practical Recommendations 
The central government should work to establish an independent judiciary 
system supported by legal practitioners with the ability to sue Chinese producers for 
violations of product safety and environmental laws. Currently no credible institutions 
exist in China for dispute resolution between Chinese producer and domestic or 
international consumers.87 All too often, local policymakers trump or thwart any 
attempted actions by legal institutions where their own personal financial interest is at 
stake. Hence, government officials and their families should be excluded from holding 
personal stakes in local enterprises within their jurisdiction. Furthermore, lawsuits 
provide an excellent incentive for producers to comply with product safety standards in 
order to avoid the burden of paying financial damages to claimants. Losses from legal 
action will likely outweigh savings from product safety regulatory avoidance. 
Admittedly, divestment of government officials from local businesses and legal action 
against producers represent dramatic cultural and political changes within Chinese 
society; however, no other credible solutions are readily apparent.  
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III. BEIJING SHOULD SEEK HELP AND COOPERATION 
(FORMAL/EXTERNAL RESPONSE) 
A. OVERVIEW FOR A FORMAL/EXTERNAL RESPONSE 
1. Expand International Interagency Cooperation 
The Chinese central government has also sought external support from other 
nations in an effort to improve China’s product safety regime. The international and 
interagency effort can assist China in surpassing decades of difficult issues that other 
industrialized nations had to endure during their own economic development period. 
Many processes and technologies that promote product safety and quality assurance 
already exist in the European Union, the United States, and Japan; therefore, Perhaps, 
China only needs to focus on the implementation of these practices, rather than the 
development of them. On the other hand, China’s economic rise differs from Japan and 
other industrialized nations with respect to its political, technological, and economic 
landscape. This solution may be less feasible or applicable than others; however, China 
remains a crucial manufacturing base for many international companies, and cooperation 
with China’s government in the improvement of product safety benefits China and the 
international community.88 
In the United States, “two federal agencies - the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 
(USDA’s) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services’ Food and Drug Administration (FDA) – are primarily responsible 
for the [United States] government’s food regulatory system.”89 Both of these agencies 
will likely play a vital role in assisting their Chinese counterparts in improving the quality 
of imports from China to the United States and other nations. The FSIS should seek to 
assist China’s General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
                                                 
88 "Stoking Protectionism: Substandard Exports from China Provoke Protectionist Responses." 
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in developing equivalent standards to the United States for the inspection meat and 
poultry producers. If China can establish a level of protection that is a least equivalent to 
the United States’ system, then China can further expand its food exports to the United 
States.90  
Table 4.   U.S. Imports of Selected Products from China: 2006.91 









As a % of 
Total U.S. 
Imports (%) 
Fish and other marine products 
(fresh, chilled, or frozen, excluding 
canned) 
1,695 1 19.8 
Animal foods 135 2 23.8 
Pharmaceuticals & medicines 698 16 1.1 
Toothpaste 3.3 6 3.5 
Tires 1,896 1 22.0 
Dolls, toys, and games 14,593 1 86.0 
 
Although the FDA does not use the equivalence-type approach on Chinese 
imports, it does have the ability visit foreign facilities and inspect their operations, when 
permitted by a foreign government.92 Hence, the FDA could assist China’s State Food 
and Drug Administration and China’s General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine by training each of these agencies with standards and 
techniques used by the FDA to inspect manufacturers and producers in China. Likewise, 
members of these Chinese agencies could travel to the United States to learn and gain 
experience from the FDA in the conduct of inspections on manufacturers in the United 
States. As recently as 2 August 2007, representatives of the United States’ Food and Drug 
Administration were in China conducting high-level talks about food and drug safety 
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with their Chinese counterparts.93 These talks are likely to yield cooperation by both 
agencies from the United States and China that will improve the product safety regime in 
China over the coming years.94   
B. COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE FOOD 
SAFETY 
China has cooperated with international committees and U.S. government 
agencies in a joint effort to improve its product safety record. Of particular note, there 
were no incidents of food contamination noted throughout the Beijing Olympics in 2008. 
Furthermore, China has also worked with the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission 
and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to improve its regulatory functions that 
protect U.S. consumers. 
1. Beijing Olympic Food Safety Expert Committee 
In the wake of the Beijing Summer Olympics of 2008, there were no reports of 
food contamination, illness, or death for any of the international Olympic participants or 
spectators. China’s food safety surrounding the Olympics resulted from Beijing’s 
deliberate effort to protect and monitor the city’s food supply for over a year before the 
Olympics. A lapse in food safety for the 10,000 athletes, 22,000 international journalist, 
and hundreds of thousands visiting spectators would have been a public relations and 
economic nightmare for Beijing during the Olympics.95 In order to prevent this 
catastrophe, China established the Beijing Olympic Food Safety Expert Committee that 
consisted of a 15 member international board of food safety and inspection experts.96 
One of the board’s experts, Professor Yifen Wang, made the following observations prior 
to the Olympics: 
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A huge amount of food will be served during the 60 days, starting prior to 
the opening of the Olympic Village through the Olympic Games. In 
addition, the Olympics will be held in summertime, a peak period for the 
outbreak of food borne illness. The volume of food being prepared for the 
Olympic Village and concessions includes 330 tons of fruits and 
vegetables, 130 tons of meat, 82 tons of seafood, 21 tons of cheese and 19 
tons of eggs. There is great pressure on us to ensure that all foods that 
enter the athletes’ village, media villages, main press center, and 
international broadcasting center at the games are safe. We are confident 
that the security program has been established is a very good, highly 
effective system.97 
Even though this special food safety system for the Olympics required the use 
radio frequency identification tags and global positioning devices, China navigated the 
Olympic Games without any negative reports with respect to food safety issues.98  
2. China’s Cooperation with U.S. Agencies to Improve Consumer 
Product Safety 
The U.S. import market remains a vital link to China’s economic rise, so China 
has cooperated with numerous U.S. agencies to appease U.S. policy makers and improve 
China’s consumer product safety regime. As of 2007, the U.S. imports more goods from 
China than any other country.99 As Morrison notes, “…imports from China totaled 
$321.5 billion, accounting for 16.5% of total U.S. imports in 2007 (up from 6.5% in 
1996).”100 At the 2007 U.S.-China “Strategic Economic Dialogue” (SED), Chinese 
officials and U.S. officials concluded several agreements to assuage the concern of U.S. 
consumers over products produced in China in order to prevent a decline in China’s 
market share of exports to the United States.101 A significant number of agreements  
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included cooperation between U.S. product safety agencies and their Chinese 
counterparts in order to stem the flow of substandard goods into the U.S. consumer 
market. 
a. U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission’s Program Plan – 
China 
The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission has adopted a program 
plan and signed a memorandum of agreement with the General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine of the People’s Republic of China in order to 
stem the flow of harmful products into the U.S. consumer market. Extensive cooperation, 
education, and open communication with its large international trading partners have 
provided China with one method of restoring international consumer faith in the “Made 
in China” label. The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission has the credibility and 
tools to provide the Chinese government and manufacturers with quality training and 
viable solutions to suit many of the productions challenges that have recently plagues the 
Sino-U.S. trade relationship. The Office of International Programs and Intergovernmental 
Affairs of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission summarize the commission’s 
mission and ability to assist in product safety matters in the United States as follows: 
Since 1972 the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (the 
“Commission” or “CPSC”) has been charged with protecting the public 
against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products, 
assisting consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer 
products, and promoting research and investigation into the causes and 
prevention of product-related deaths, illnesses, and injuries.102 
It is interesting to note that the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission has only 
existed for approximately four decades even though the United States has been an 
industrialized country for well over a century. Regardless, U.S. consumers expect China 
to meet quality and safety standards that have become the standard in industrialized 
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nations even though China’s own industrialization and export market approach is only 
three decades old. Nevertheless, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission offers 
China’s consumer product safety regime and Chinese manufacturers best practices, 
monitoring, and experience that will assist China in restoring the international market’s 
faith in products from China.  
The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission derived its China 
Program from two agreements between the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission 
and the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine of the 
People’s Republic of China. First, the “Memorandum of Understanding” was signed on 
21 April 2004 “in order to protect the health and safety of [Chinese and American] 
consumers.”103 Gutierrez, the Acting Director of the Office of International Programs and 
Intergovernmental Affairs for the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, highlights 
the focus areas within the Memorandum of Understanding: 
The MOU pledges the signatories to seven specific areas of cooperation: 
(1) Exchanges of scientific, technical and regulatory information; (2) 
Agreement on a list of consumer products for cooperation; (3) Exchange 
of information on emerging consumer product issues; (4) Consultation on 
consumer product safety issues relating to specific products that are 
manufactured in one signatory country and sold in the other; (5) 
Consideration of inspections results obtained by laboratories by the other 
country; (6) Training of laboratory and inspection personnel, and (7) 
Development of a Plan of Action for Cooperation.104 
Second, “The Plan of Action for Cooperation” signed on 30 August 2005 “establish[ed] a 
mechanism for communication and coordination between [the General Administration of 
Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine of the People’s Republic of China and 
the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission Staff]” and “create[d] a process for 
bilateral cooperation through the creation of working groups in specific consumer 
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product industry segments.”105 Finally, China and the United States have also agreed to 
hold a “biennial Sino-U.S. Consumer Product Safety Summit.”106 These two agreements 
and the biennial summit form the backbone of China’s attempt to improve the quality of 
its consumer product safety regime through specific cooperation with the U.S. Consumer 
Product Safety Commission.  
The most critical aspects of these agreements involve the training of 
quality inspection personnel in China, exchanges of quality assurance practices and 
technology, and finally the Sino-U.S. Consumer Product Safety Summit. Unfortunately, 
since both agreements have been in place the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission 
reports that “…from January-December 2007, over four-fifths of CPSC recall notices 
have involved Chinese products.”107 The number of recalls for Chinese imports remains 
disproportionately high, even though China’s exports to the United States reached $321.5 
billion in 2007.108 
b. U.S. Food and Drug Administration – China Partnerships 
In addition to the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, China’s 
government has also collaborated with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration on issues 
related to China’s consumer product safety regime. The U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration provides and overview of its general mission in protecting U.S. 
consumers and its specific role with China. Imports of over $2 trillion dollars and 25 
percent of an American’s income used to pay for products protected by the FDA leaves 
the FDA in a lurch with only approximately 680 qualified inspectors capable of 
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inspection on one percent of imports into the United States.109 Collaboration and 
cooperation between the U.S. Food and Drug Administration – a branch of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services – and the General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People’s Republic of China will play a key 
role in the resolution and prevention of product safety lapses resulting from China’s 
fledgling consumer product safety regime.  
At the conclusion of six months of bilateral discussions between officials 
from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, the Chinese Food and Drug 
Administration, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and the General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) of the 
People’s Republic of China, the arbitrators established two memoranda of agreement 
between China and the United States to govern the product safety oversight and standards 
for food and medical imports to the United States. The Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, Mike Leavitt, set forth an overview of a memorandum of agreement between 
China and the United States. The memorandum of agreement set clear deadlines, actions, 
and policies that the Chinese must meet in order to continue to provide household goods 
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to American consumers.110 Secretary Leavitt’s statement addresses the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services’ effort to encourage China’s product safety regulatory 
bodies to set forth a system that would allow for place of origin controls that monitor and 
isolate defective food and drug products at the earliest possible point in the supply-chain. 
It is prohibitively expensive for the U.S. Food and Drug administration to inspect a 
substantive sample of imports to provide reasonable assurance that food and drug imports 
are safe for public consumption.111 No inspection and monitoring system can assure 100 
percent quality and safety, yet the agreements between the two primary food and drug 
safety agencies of the United States and China at least represent movement in the right 
direction if the agreement is followed up with action.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL 
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION ON CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY 
ISSUES 
1. International Interagency Cooperation 
China’s government has made remarkable advances in its cooperation with both 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the U.S. Consumer Product Safety 
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Commission in an effort to improve China’s consumer product safety regime. Beijing’s 
ability to successfully host the Olympics with no major food or drug product safety lapses 
demonstrates China’s ability to protect both its domestic and international market; 
however, China must continue to develop rigorous standards of protection without the 
incentive of major international events such as the Olympic Games. Both the United 
States and China should be lauded for their growing cooperation on matters of product 
safety, yet the work of each nation must continue in order for the relationship to bear 
long-term results. 
a. Recommendations 
• Allow for greater transparency between major trading partners – the 
United States, the European Union, and Japan – by permitting periodic 
inspections of product safety regulators performing their jobs. 
Additionally, permit foreign product safety regulators to periodically 
inspect various companies in cooperation with Chinese regulators. 
• When a lapse in product safety occurs, Chinese regulators should launch a 
cooperative investigation into the matter with the affected trading 
partner’s consumer product safety agency. This solution requires a level of 
transparency that the Chinese Communist Party may be unwilling to offer; 
however, the measure would assist in restoring confidence in the “Made in 
China” brand. 
b. Barriers to Implementation 
Under ideal circumstances, China could depend upon the United States, 
Japan, and the European Union for earnest cooperation in developing and improving 
China’s consumer product safety regime. Unfortunately, cooperation from international 
trade partners often hinges upon the degree of a country’s self-interest in protecting their 
own markets from Chinese competition. Additionally, institutions often lag the market, so 
that in a global economy that has been rapidly grown and altered by information 
technology and globalization, product safety regulatory regimes in most countries have 
failed to keep pace with their growing domestic economies. In other words, regulatory 
agencies are understaffed and underfunded throughout the world, so these agencies have 
little capacity to support another country in the development of their own consumer 
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product safety regime.112 Hence, protectionist tendencies and understaffed product safety 
regulatory regimes prohibit more robust cooperation on product safety issues between 
China and its major trading partners – the European Union, Japan, and the United States.  
c. Practical Recommendations 
International cooperation on product safety faces a myriad of challenges 
that hamper the practicality and efficiency of this recommendation. The best form of 
international cooperation rests with the education and training that China’s major trading 
partners can provide to Chinese product safety regulators. Regulators from China should 
attend training with national and international product safety regulatory agencies 
throughout the world. Chinese regulators should then return to China with the goal of 
applying international product safety regulations and best practices within the unique 
context of the Chinese economy.  
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IV. BEIJING SHOULD EXPLORE NONREGULATORY 
SOLUTIONS (INFORMAL/INTERNAL RESPONSE) 
A. OVERVIEW FOR AN INFORMAL/INTERNAL RESPONSE 
1. Adopt International Standards 
Product safety reforms will also flourish in the form of informal (non-regulatory) 
solutions that aim to improve the business practices of China’s manufacturers and 
producers. These companies can assist the restoration and strengthening of the “Made in 
China” label by adopting the following practices: supply chain management, quality 
assurance standards, employee training on product safety requirements, and a sense of 
corporate accountability.  
An immediate improvement in each of these areas would result if Chinese food 
producers implemented International Standard for Organization (ISO) 22000. As already 
noted ISO 22000 is specifically designed to raise the standards of “food supply chains 
worldwide and part of a wider series of planned international systems for safety 
management.113 Adoption of this standard would provide international consumers with 
an auditable standard with clear requirements.114 As a result of this practice, China could 
ensure the safety and quality of food for both the domestic and export market. 
An alternative to ISO 22000 to support Chinese producers is Six Sigma. The latter 
provides a quality control methodology that has increased the profits of the world’s top 
corporations by a collective $100 billion over the past ten years.115 The spread of Six 
Sigma practices throughout a growing number of Fortune 500 companies involves a 
focus on production and manufacturing and has simplified training and provided a broad 
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base of literature on the subject.116 While Six Sigma may not be appropriate for small 
companies in China, it is certainly reasonable to expect that it would be effective for large 
international companies based in China.  
However, the implementation of such international standards requires a major up-
front capital investment that most Chinese companies cannot afford. A complex struggle 
between quality and price was at the center of China’s recent bout of consumer product 
safety issues. Large multinational corporations demand that Chinese companies keep 
their price low, yet these same multinational corporations also demand that Chinese 
companies raise their product quality and ensure product safety requirements are met.117 
Unfortunately, the strong pressure to produce low cost goods has likely encouraged some 
Chinese suppliers to cut corners on product safety issues.118  
In order to assist Chinese companies in resolving the dilemma between 
maintaining or improving product quality and keeping costs low, two things must occur: 
 
• Multinational corporations have to accept the fact that the “China price” 
must rise as Chinese companies face higher costs for labor, raw materials, 
taxes, environmental protection, and quality assurance to improve product 
safety.119 
 
• China’s central government must assist Chinese companies with the 
adoption of international production standards through financial 
incentives. 
2. Implement Lessons from Japan 
Japan has been recognized as a leader in product safety and quality over the past 
three decades; however, in the immediate post-1945 era Japan’s economy experienced 
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many of the same problems that China is currently experiencing in product quality and 
safety. Adaptation of statistical quality control spurred the development of Japan’s 
outstanding quality and safety regime.120 Hence, China would likely realize the same 
benefits if it adopts statistical quality control as an industry standard. Unfortunately if 
China implements statistical quality control, the gains will take a long time to realize, and 
the initial costs of implementation will be high. However, the rewards are great. 
B. INTERNATIONAL PRODUCT SAFETY STANDARDS 
In recognition of the product safety lapses that plagued China in the early part of 
2007, the Chinese government released a white paper entitled The Quality and Safety of 
Food in China.121 The white paper details how food safety in China is regulated and 
tracked from source to consumer, and the system appears to be comparable to other 
industrialized countries. Unfortunately, product safety lapses with respect to both food 
and drugs continue to occur. ISO 22000 provides an internationally recognized system to 
ensure food safety, yet it may be too expensive, cumbersome, and difficult for Chinese 
companies to reasonably implement in the near future. On the other hand, Six Sigma has 
been more successful and less costly, so perhaps China can invest in training individuals 
to become disciples of the quality based management practices that it espouses. 
Ultimately, standards of any sort will prove useless unless earnestly implemented by 
China’s corporations and enforced by China’s government.  
1. Existing Food and Drug Product Safety Standards in China 
China claims to have a robust food safety regulatory system that monitors food 
production from the source to the consumer.122 DeWoskin highlights China’s defense of 
its food safety record with empirical evidence: 
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In mid August [2007] the [Chinese] State Council issued a “White Paper 
on Food Quality and Safety.” In defense of China’s food-export record, it 
notes that even Japan rated China’s exports as the most highly acceptable 
among all of its imported foods. Even though Japan conducted more 
sample surveys on Chinese food than that from anywhere else, it had the 
highest acceptance rate at 99.42%. In 2006 and the first half of 2007, the 
acceptance rate of Chinese food shipments to the U.S. was 99.2% and 
99.1%, respectively. In the case of the EU, the figures were 99.9% and 
99.8%, respectively.123 
In order to ensure this level of food quality, China implemented several measures to 
protect consumers. First, the Hazard-Free Food Action Plan reduces highly toxic residues 
from agricultural pesticides and eliminated the use of illegal pesticides in food 
production.124 Second, food producers are now required to be licensed under the 
production license system, and food producers are also required to label items with a 
“QS” label to symbolize the passage of compulsory quality inspections prior to an item 
being placed on the market for consumption.125 Third, a food recall system has been 
implemented to notify consumers and recall dangerous food products from the market 
whenever a lapse in the quality inspection process occurs.126 Finally, China’s government 
emphasizes the principles of “prevention first, supervision at the source, and control 
throughout the process” in order to ensure the quality of food exports from China.127 
China’s government has created a satisfactory quality control system to protect 
consumers from tainted or dangerous food products; however, the system remains 
flawed. There is a major shortage of government inspectors and poor government 
oversight remains widespread. More broadly the government and the corporate sector 
continue to display an often disingenuous commitment to quality and safety. Finally 
endemic corruption at all levels of Chinese government and society hampers from the 
outset virtually any initiative, no matter how rigorous it might be on paper.  
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2. Potential for ISO Standards in China 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) consist of a network of 
national standards institutes in 157 countries that comprise the “world’s largest developer 
and publisher of International Standards.”128 The organization provides a wide array of 
standardization procedures related to topics ranging from simple manufacturing processes 
to food and drug safety. The procedures developed by the ISO draw upon experienced 
field experts, governments of industrialized nations, and the United Nations. ISO touts 
the organization’s ability to leverage product quality and safety from its well-tested and 
internationally recognized process of standardization of consumer product safety features 
in the global business market.129 China has the potential to reap enormous economic 
benefits from increased international trade in high-value items through the adoption of 
ISO standards, yet China’s government, its manufacturers, and producers must be willing 
to bear the costs of implementation, development, enforcement, and training required to 
achieve internationally recognized production standards. 
China’s ability to safeguard consumers through the implementation if ISO 
standards has real potential to provide the country with greater trade, an enhanced 
reputation as a producer in the consumer market, and access to innovative technologies 
that would make product quality control more manageable. If the brand, “Made in 
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China,” were to increasingly stand for safe consumer goods produced well and sold at a 
good price, then China has the potential to move up the product value chain into 
producing more complex items, such as automobiles, for the international market, 
especially the United States.  
ISO 22000 provides standards for all organizations with supply chains for food 
production.130 Developed in conjunction with the United Nation Food and Agricultural 
Organization (UNFAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO), ISO 22000 assists 
food producer in complying with the Codex Hazardous Analysis and Critical Control 
Point (HACCP) system for food hygiene.131 ISO 22000 monitors quality and sets 
standards at every level of the food supply chain from the crop producer to the consumer 
(Figure 4). ISO 22000 offers China’s government the basis for the establishment of a safe 
food supply chain that is recognized and used by its international trading partners.  
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Figure 4.   ISO 22000 Example of Communication within the Food Supply Chain.132 
 
 
Despite the benefits of ISO 22000, China has not declared that it has any intention 
of implementing it. Even the recent incident of melamine tainted instant milk that took 
the lives of four infants and made 53,000 babies seriously ill has not swayed China to 
adopt ISO 22000.133 Meanwhile, India, partly in response to the negative reaction by 
China, is adopting ISO 22000 in at least 50 of its food production laboratories to support 
10,000 farms by 2009.134 
                                                 
132 Frost, "I.S.O. 22000 Is First in Family of Food Safety Management System Standards," 17. 
133 Ansell, "Introduction: Holding China Accountable? Protecting Consumers in Global Markets," 2. 
134 "Lessons from China Food Safety Standards to Be Overhauled," in The Financial Times (The 
Financial Times, September 27, 2008). 
  58
China will not adopt ISO 22000 or any other ISO standards because it remains 
trapped as a low-cost producer that faces rising labor rates in a hyper-competitive 
globalized economy. China’s producers are focused on short-term profits instead of long-
term gains. Margins on many food and drug products are tight, so the short-term costs of 
becoming a reputable international producer of consumer goods are very high. At the 
national level the Chinese government has demonstrated a commitment to product quality 
improvement through legislation and sporadic incidents of enforcement to placate 
international trading partners and multi-national corporations. However, at the lower 
levels the government was, to mention only one well-known incident, complicit in the 
melamine tainted milk fiasco. In order to correct the product quality problems that plague 
China, the Chinese government and Chinese producers must accept the short-term costs 
of standardization, inspection, and enforcement in order to realize the long-term 
economic benefits that the globalized economy offers a rapidly growing China.  
C. POTENTIAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM JAPAN 
Although the economic rise of China and Japan differ with respect to the impetus 
for growth, natural resources, monetary capital, human capital, and historical timing, a 
review of Japan’s quality and statistical control has the potential to assist China in 
improving its consumer product safety regime. After World War II, “Made in Japan” 
represented a label that stood for inexpensive, unreliable, substandard goods, yet now 
“Made in Japan” represents expensive and reliable goods worldwide.135 Will “Made in 
China” carry the same esteem as “Made in Japan” in 2040?  
1. Lessons Learned from W. Edward Deming and Japan’s Post-World 
War II Product Quality Revolution 
In 1950, Japan’s economy lay devastated in the aftermath of World War II. Japan 
had few natural resources and most of its population lived on less than 1,000 calories per 
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day.136 In 1945 Japan’s GDP had declined to one-third of its pre-war level, yet it 
managed to regain its pre-war GDP by 1955.137 Even more impressively, Japan currently 
ranks as the second largest economy in the world with a monstrous GDP of $4.534 
trillion.138 So how did Japan achieve this amazing economic feat in only six decades, and 
is it possible for China to do the same? 
From 1945 until 1952, General Douglas MacArthur led reconstruction efforts in 
Japan. His staff included a few Bell Laboratory engineers that provided Japanese 
engineers with literature on quality control.139 The majority of the literature that the 
Japanese engineers used to develop quality control came from a senior Bell Laboratory 
engineer, Walter Shewhart.140 Walter Shewhart has been dubbed the “father of statistical 
quality control.”141 Although W. Edward Deming did not work for Bell Laboratory, he 
became Shewhart’s most recognized student and disciple. In 1950, Deming joined the 
reconstruction effort in Japan with the specific task of teaching quality control 
engineering to Japanese manufacturers.142 
Deming found a receptive audience in Japan, and Japanese engineers soon learned 
that quality improvements also led to productivity improvements with fewer recalls and a 
general reduction in defective items.143 Deming did not focus on conventional 
inspections at the end of the manufacturing process; he emphasized the need to design 
quality into the input side of the process in order to reduce defective products at their 
point of output. Many of the lessons that Deming brought to Japan in 1950 remain valid 
in China, America, and other industrialized lessons. 
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a. Deming’s 14 Points of Management 
In order to teach others his principles of management and quality control, 
Deming developed 14 key points to guide management (Appendix). These 14 points of 
management shaped Japan’s quality revolution and subsequently its economic rise. 
Deming’s legacy of quality lives on in Japan as evidenced by the world’s most profitable 
carmaker, Toyota. In his book, The Toyota Way, Liker highlights the Toyota Production 
System (TPS) that expresses a twenty-first century derivation of Deming’s original 14 
points of management.144 Perhaps the most vital elements of Japan’s management legacy 
is its focus on long-term philosophy of quality over quantity, its aversion to short-term 
cost reductions, the development of human capital, and the support and supervision of 
suppliers in forming and maintaining long-term quality focused relationships with the 
company.145 
2. China’s Barriers to Adaptation of Japanese Quality Control Methods 
Unfortunately, the likelihood that the Chinese will adopt Japanese management 
and quality control practices remains slight. First, China has a long history of animosity 
towards Japan as a result particularly of the abuses suffered by the Chinese during 
Japan’s occupation of Manchuria in the early twentieth century and the brutal and full-
scale war on China conducted by Japan from the mid-1930s to 1945. Relationships 
between the two countries are warming, but it is unlikely that Chinese nationalism and 
anti-Japanese sentiment will make it easy to view Japan as a role-model in business 
management or any other capacity. Second, China has achieved three decades of rapid 
economic growth – as evidenced by GDP – that has averaged approximately 9 percent 
per year beginning in 1979.146 China’s growth has largely been derived from serving as 
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the world’s “factory floor” through the utilization of its comparative advantage: its huge 
pool of high-quality, inexpensive labor.147 Both the Chinese government and Chinese 
firms have focused upon economic growth rather than quality production. Economic 
vitality is crucial to the stability of the Chinese Communist Party, and Chinese firms are 
driven by large multi-national corporations to provide low cost manufacturing in order to 
survive in a hyper-competitive globalized economy.148 These imperatives tend to 
emphasize short-term economic gains via production short cuts and substandard 
materials, at the cost of long-term sustainable economic development driven by quality 
production and material. If China earnestly wishes to protect the “Made in China” label, 
then it has to focus upon human capital development, improved working conditions for 
its vast labor pool, and the development of quality control methods that protect 
consumers, use quality materials and produce well-made goods. It is this that will lead to 
stable and long-term economic growth.  
D.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHINA WITH RESPECT TO ADOPTION 
OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCT SAFETY STANDARDS AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF LESSONS LEARNED FROM JAPAN 
1. ISO 22000 
Although China attests that it has already implemented quality control standards 
designed to ensure product safety standards are met from the point of origin to the 
consumer, numerous product safety incidents have demonstrated flaws within the 
Chinese government’s quality control system.149 International Standards, such as ISO 
22000 and possibly Six Sigma, would improve quality controls and provide an 
internationally recognized quality control system that China’s international trading 
partners would understand. 
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a. Recommendations 
• Adopt international quality control standards that conform to the 
equivalent standards of its dominant trading partners-competitors, such as 
the United States, the European Union, and Japan. 
b. Barriers to Implementation 
International quality control standards represent only a portion of the 
solution to restoring consumer confidence in the “Made in China” brand. Although China 
has not adopted ISO 22000, Six-Sigma, or even CODEX standards, the Administration of 
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine revised over 1,800 food safety standards 
that led to the closing of 152,000 food producers and retailers in July of 2007.150 Actions 
by China’s officials may prove more important than any widely recognized international 
standard; however, international standards provide assurances and familiar standards to 
China’s major trading partners. Additionally, China may be unwilling to adopt 
international standards because of cost and inability to furnish millions of food producers 
with large volumes of international standards translated into Mandarin or Cantonese 
languages. Finally, many producers in China consist of less than ten employees, so it is 
difficult for such small enterprises to implement complex regulation and requirements. 
One should bear in mind that none of these producers directly supply products for export; 
however, small producers are subcontracted to produce a major ingredient of an exported 
product.151 For example, dairy farmers in China typically have three to five cows that 
produce milk, so these farmers give their milk to larger exporting companies to refine and 
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export.152 China’s adoption of international quality control standards will evolve only 
after achieving higher levels of per capita economic success; hence, implementation 
costs, applicability, and availability remain the primary components that make China’s 
government averse to adopting widely recognized international quality control 
standards.153  
c. Practical Recommendations 
Although ISO 22000 standards may be too costly to implement, the 
CODEX standards that have been jointly developed by the Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations and the World Health Organization offer highly-
specific quality control regulations for food products at no direct cost for access.154 The 
quality standards offered by the United Nations are available for download from the 
United Nations Website, and training on the implementation of the quality control 
standards are also available on the website.155 Unfortunately, the standards and training 
are only available from the United Nations Website in English, Spanish, and French, so 
the Chinese government would have to fund translation of all materials into Mandarin 
and Cantonese.156  
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2. Lessons from Japan 
Additionally, China can cull many lessons from Japan’s economic rise after 
World War II – particularly, the lessons on quality produced by W. Edward Deming. The 
latter would assist China in restoring international consumer confidence in the “Made in 
China” brand.  
a. Recommendations 
• Review the lessons from Japan’s quality-based economic rise from 1950s 
onward. 
b. Barriers to Implementation 
Although Japan represents one of the best examples of product quality 
control during the Twentieth Century, older Chinese harbor strong nationalistic and anti-
Japanese feeling that resulted from atrocities committed by the Japanese in China from 
1937 to 1945, specifically the Nanjing massacre.157 Additionally, China has long 
considered itself the center of Asian culture, so it may be hard to look towards Japan for 
lessons on economic development, specifically in the area of quality assurance.  
Additionally, Japan’s economic development and quality control regime 
developed in an era that predated globalization. Deming’s methods may no longer be the 
fundamental process to achieve quality assurance. Great strides been made with respect 
to best practices in quality control over the last five decades. For example, the Toyota 
Production System is now widely viewed by business professionals as the hallmark of 
statistical quality control and businesses systems.158 Again, pride may prevent China 
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from adopting a Japanese systems of management and quality control, yet it is not 
unreasonable to assume that China would benefit from either Deming’s or Toyota’s 
principles of management and quality control.  
In summary, China would benefit from Japanese developed quality control 
systems; however, regional animosities, nationalistic pride, and political tensions would 
likely prevent China’s central government and producers from whole-heartedly 
embracing Japanese business principles.  
c. Practical Recommendations 
In order to save face and advance China’s economic development, China’s 
central government should develop quality control systems based upon the highlighted 
Japanese business and quality control principles; however, China’s central government 
should claim that the initiative and principles developed from Sino-culture. This approach 
would prevent the hindrance of Chinese economic development caused by nationalistic 
pride and animosity towards Japan. Unfortunately, this only solves one aspect of the 
problem. 
Perhaps the most difficult challenge to the China’s producers would be the 
implementation of these advanced quality control and business practices that require a 
producer to place a premium on quality production and an emphasis on long-term 
organizational objectives. China’s producers appear to be trapped in a period of 
development that emphasizes short-term economic gains at any cost.  
In summary, China’s producers will only be able to adopt Japanese 
management and quality control principles when economic incentives for quality 
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V. BEIJING SHOULD PRESENT ITS CASE 
(INFORMAL/EXTERNAL RESPONSE) 
A. OVERVIEW FOR AN INFORMAL/EXTERNAL RESPONSE 
1. Permit Media Coverage 
The Chinese central government sporadically cooperates with the media and non-
governmental organizations that promote consumer protection in order to identify 
potential consumer safety violations and to ferret out corrupt businesspersons or officials. 
The media has played an essential role in uncovering the plight of China’s rural peasantry 
and environmental degradation.159 Hence, the media’s role in assisting the central 
government with the exposure of noncompliant officials and businesspersons will also 
assist in the quest to improve product safety. Openness and candor upon the matter of 
product safety by the Chinese central government will only serve to improve and enforce 
the regulations and standards of China’s product safety regime.  
2. Improve Public Relations to Overcome Sensationalism 
China must present its side of the case in the international debate over its 
consumer product safety regime. A public relations campaign should convey these 
messages: 
• China has almost a 99% acceptance rate for its exports in most developed 
countries.160 
• China should acknowledge the extent of the problem with its consumer 
product safety regime, while taking vigorous corrective actions to alleviate 
the problems. 
 
                                                 
159 Chen and Chuntao, Will the Boat Sink the Water?: The Life of China's Peasants, 19-22, 41-43, and 
49. 
160 Xiangwei, "Product Safety Flap Has Upside for Mainlanders." 
  68
Messages like these have and will aid in defeating some of the sensationalism that 
has driven the international media to focus so heavily on this issue. Additionally, it will 
help restore the confidence of pragmatic consumers and manufacturers in the “Made in 
China” label. 
3. Resolve Protectionism 
China must not irrationally stop products coming in from the United States and 
other countries in a tit-for-tat response to possible bans on Chinese products in the United 
States.161 Trade bans on certain products could lead to unnecessary trade wars, and no 
one would benefit. Therefore, diplomatic and business efforts must go forth in resolving 
American and international concerns over China’s consumer product safety regime. If 
diplomatic and business efforts are successful, then the product safety concerns can be 
resolved on all sides without a trade war.  
B. MEDIA: A TOOL TO EXPOSE PRODUCT SAFETY ISSUES 
The Chinese Communist Party controls freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press in order to maintain political stability and minimize social unrest in the most 
populous nation in the world.162 Beijing has already permitted greater media access and 
freedom when it serves the central governments objective. For instance, provincial-, 
township-, and village-level Chinese Communist Party officials have received extensive 
media coverage for their abuse of peasants, over taxation, and corrupt practices in 
general.163 Unfortunately, the central government has failed to realize the leverage the 
media could have in an effort to enforce China’s consumer product safety laws. 
Information represents power, and the central government fears that negative media 
attention on the quality control of Chinese consumer goods could lead to a slowdown in 
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the country’s booming export business. A slowdown may occur as short-term side-effect 
of a loss of confidence in many China’s production processes; however, long term 
benefits would restore international confidence in China’s consumer product safety 
regime and lead to sustainable export demand after safety issues are exposed and 
corrected.  
Although the Chinese Communist Party exposes itself to political vulnerabilities, 
media outlets, such as the press and the internet, should be allowed to carry more 
information about corporate and official misconduct that threatens consumer product 
safety. Media coverage serves as a force multiplier in support of the General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) of the 
People’s Republic of China. At a minimum, the central government should not suppress 
information about tainted food products that threaten a globalized food supply network. 
In the September 2008 melamine-tainted milk scandal, reports of product safety problems 
were made by consumers to the manufacturer as early as December 2007; however, the 
Chinese company took no action and did not inform the government.164 In a more 
permissive media environment, consumers who noted problems could have reported 
problems with the milk via the internet or the press, and perhaps illness and death among 
these children could have been avoided.  
C. PUBLIC RELATIONS: GUIDELINES FOR RESTORING THE “MADE IN 
CHINA” BRAND IMAGE 
A brand represents how consumers perceive a company’s (or a country’s) 
product.165 Although China is not a company, it does have a brand image associated with 
the “Made in China” label. China represents a partial anomaly because companies are 
normally associated with branding. For instance, when a consumer sees a Toyota product, 
the consumer does not necessarily associate the product with Japan. On the other hand, 
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China’s competitive advantage currently relies upon an abundant, inexpensive, and 
efficient source of labor, so China’s current role in the globalized economy is primarily 
as the site for outsourced manufacturing and production by multinational corporations. In 
essence, a consumer buys the Apple brand of computer because it symbolizes quality and 
innovation, yet the actual item was manufactured or assembled in China. Hence, the 
“Made in China” label is a brand, and it must be protected by the Chinese government, 
Chinese producers, and multinational corporations in order to ensure sustained economic 
success for all concerned.  
Unfortunately, the positive image that China constructed during the Beijing 2008 
Summer Olympic Games has been severely hampered by the tainted milk scandal that 
began in September 2008. The Economist reports, “A survey by Interbrand, a 
consultancy, shows that the post-Olympic improvement in the perception of the “Made in 
China” brand has been wiped out by the [melamine tainted milk] scandal.”166 So how 
does China begin to restore its brand image? To begin with, and in contrast to the 
secretive nature of the Chinese Communist Party, scandals should be dealt with in an 
open international forum that permits media coverage, which can effectively evaluate and 
uncover problems with product safety. In the most recent melamine tainted milk scandal, 
several reports complained that China’s government thwarted the media’s attempts to 
gain direct access to company and government officials associated with the debacle. 
Additionally Chinese journalists are suppressed by the Chinese government.167 
Consumers are less likely to trust products made in China, so the Chinese economy will 
suffer a decrease in demand with respect to certain products. In June 2008, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco concluded that “recalls of consumer products  
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manufactured in China did have an adverse effect on U.S. imports from China.”168 
Substantive changes by the Chinese government have to be made in order to curb this 
trend.  
The primary measure in repairing the tarnished “Made in China” brand relies 
upon government and corporate accountability from China’s economic stakeholders. In 
an age of information proliferation via the media, internet, and mobile communication 
devices, the control of information remains an illusive enterprise for companies and 
governments alike. Consumers report product safety violations, so it is in China’s best 
economic and public relations interest to admit mistakes to the international public in a 
rapid and responsible manner.169 Any delay in reporting a lapse in product safety 
jeopardizes consumers’ health and generates mistrust of the “Made in China” brand in the 
international community. The public can tolerate bad news and honest mistakes; 
however, the public cannot tolerate corruption and dishonesty in the realm of product 
safety.  
According to the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, China leads the 
world in the percentage of product recalls in the United States.170 This will continue to be 
of particular concern where the hygiene standards involved in the preparation of  
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products, such as food and drugs, is concerned.171 In order to repair the damage to the 
“Made in China” brand, China must be honest with consumers, reduce corruption, and 
enforce consumer product safety laws. 
D. DISSUADE PROTECTIONIST RESPONSES FROM INTERNATIONAL 
TRADING PARTNERS 
Product safety concerns provide a convenient reason for U.S. legislators to take a 
strong stand against imports from China. Many congressional leaders want the Bush 
administration (2000-2008) to take a stronger stance with respect to China on issues that 
violate acceptable practices within the World Trade Organization or harm U.S. economic 
interests.172 Additionally, the trade imbalance between China and the United States grew 
to $256 billion in 2007. This figure represents a stark rise from a trade deficit of $30 
billion in 1994.173 Americans that are already stricken by a severe economic downturn 
and growing job losses to outsourcing and innovation may compel U.S. lawmakers to 
react to short-term lapses in product safety in order to protect the U.S. domestic market 
from certain imports from China. 
If U.S. legislators enact a quality ban against Chinese food or drug imports, China 
will likely view the quality related ban as a masked form of protectionism.174 It would 
only be natural for China to respond in kind to an American ban on Chinese products. 
“Foreign retaliation” to trade barriers sets the scene for a trade war between two trading 
partners.175 Although a quality ban against Chinese imports by the American government 
may be a protectionist measure in some capacity, China must avoid a response that would 
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escalate trade tensions between itself and one of its major importers. Any ban is likely to 
be temporary. American consumers and large American companies – Wal-Mart, for 
example – would lobby U.S. lawmakers to reverse the trade ban once the costs of the 
protectionist measure became evident.176 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHINA WITH RESPECT TO SOFT 
POWER SOLUTIONS AND BRAND IMAGE 
1. Media 
Although the Chinese government has been reluctant to allow the domestic and 
international media unfettered access to cover product safety lapses, corruption, and 
weakness within the consumer product regulatory regime, the media represents a 
powerful lever that could greatly assist the Chinese government in its effort to improve its 
reputation for product safety and quality. Historically, the Chinese Communist Party has 
limited freedom of speech and freedom of the press in order to maintain a tight reign on 
its populace. Alternatively, the Chinese Communist Party remains in power largely 
because of the economic success the country has experience over the past three decades. 
Product quality issues threaten the economic advance of China and the stability of the 
Chinese Communist Party’s rule. If the party permits the media additional freedom, the 
media is likely to expose corrupt officials and unsafe practices within companies that are 
potentially harmful to consumers. Additionally, it is almost impossible to keep product 
safety issues out of the media given the numerous methods of communication from inside 
China to the outside world. Meanwhile, every incident that is covered-up by the party or 
company officials, but eventually is exposed, diminishes the faith of consumers in the 
“Made in China” brand. 
a. Recommendations 
• Grant the media unfettered access to all matters concerning product safety 
within China. 
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b. Barriers to Implementation 
In 2005 the U.S. Congressional – Executive Commission on China urged 
the President and Congress to encourage China to remove restrictions on the news media, 
yet the Chinese Communist Party remains unlikely to remove restrictions on the media 
that includes media blackouts on certain events that might destabilize the Party’s rule in 
China.177 China’s central government has to evaluate the costs and the benefits of a 
media that operates with freedom and little fear of reprisal. A free press provides an 
essential element in a well-functioning product regulatory system.178 Local officials and 
producers starve the central government of information; therefore, when problems arise 
with respect to product quality, the problem has already risen to a level of epic 
proportions before the central government even has an opportunity to respond.179 The 
September 2008 melamine tainted powdered milk scandal provides an excellent example 
of this form of “information asymmetry.”180 On the other hand, a free press provides 
information to the people as well as the central government; therefore, this leads the 
public to pressure the central government for reforms on issues of local governance and 
product safety.181 If the central government fails to respond to public outcry, then 
incidents of social unrest are likely to occur, and ultimately social unrest threatens the 
political stability of the Chinese Communist Party that leads China’s central 
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government.182 In an effort maintain continuity, China’s central government suppresses 
the media through regulation and market incentives.  
First, the central government, local governments, and businesses control 
journalists through coercion. China has imprisoned more journalists than any other 
country in the world, so many journalists are too intimidated to report on controversial 
issues, such as China’s consumer product safety issues.183 If intimidation fails, then 
businesses often bribe reporters to bury embarrassing stories.184 For example, a mining 
accident occurred at a gold mine in China, so when a few reporters arrived on the scene 
of the tragedy, the mining company bribed reporters with solid gold bars in order to 
conceal the story.185 Coercion and bribery serve local governments and businesses by 
containing embarrassing or scandalous information that could incur the wrath of the 
central government or the public.  
Second, all news reporting agencies require a license from the General 
Administration of Press and Publication.186 Additionally, radio and television operators 
require a license from the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television.187 
Finally, internet content providers require a license from the Ministry of Information 
Industry.188 China’s central government bureaucracy wishes to limit the number of media 
outlets in China, so the central government issues reporting licenses in a sparing 
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manner.189 In addition to the layers of bureaucracy required to obtain a broadcasting or 
reporting license, each media outlet has to be sponsored by a governmental body that 
reports to China’s central government.190 This governmental body tacitly monitors the 
reporting agency; however, the reporting agency could be reprimanded or lose its 
sponsorship if it reports on an issue that might embarrass China’s government or threaten 
China’s economic growth.191 Hence, reporting agencies in China are hamstrung by 
bureaucratic licensing procedures and the threat of being shutdown for crossing the vague 
line of censorship.192  
Finally, financial incentives for reporters work against extensive 
investigative journalism.193 Reporters receive a small base salary, so reporters depend 
upon a compensation structure that rewards the volume of stories published instead of the 
quality of stories published.194 Hence, a reporter that does an extensive and controversial 
report will not receive any compensation for his efforts.195 Controversial pieces are not 
published, and the journalist who developed the story wasted his time and risked coercive 
repercussions from Chinese officials.196 
In summary, China’s central government considers the cost of journalistic 
freedom too high when compared to the benefits. A free media could channel information 
quickly from local provinces and townships to the upper echelons of the central 
government much faster and more honestly than the bureaucratic chain of information 
flow that currently pervades China’s political culture. Alternatively, a free media would 
likely lead to a higher degree of social unrest and political instability. Consequently, 
increased political instability could lead to a regime change that could displace the 
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Chinese Communist Party. Hence, the Chinese Communist Party will continue to stifle 
any efforts to develop and free and independent media within China.  
c. Practical Recommendations 
With the practical realization that journalistic freedom compromises the 
central government’s grasp on power, other alternatives to curb product safety problems 
through the media remain viable. For example, the central government could pay 
reporters to investigate local Chinese official and businesses that are suspected of skirting 
product safety regulations. Reporters could then report that their efforts to expose the 
corrupt leadership or businesses came at the behest of China’s central government. 
Hence, local level officials and businesses are embarrassed and punished while the 
central government appears as an advocate for the Chinese domestic consumer. This 
alternative runs little risk of social unrest that would be directed at the central 
government. 
2. Public Relations 
Although China is not a company, it does possess a brand identity – “Made in 
China” – that must be protected. China can restore its brand image through greater 
transparency to the public on issues concerning product safety. Hence, whenever a 
product safety issue arises, the Chinese government must not issue denials as it has in the 
past. The issue should be confronted head-on in an honest and truthful manner that 
exposes the facts regardless of the incident. Additionally, the Chinese government can 
control the spin in the international media by offering more substantive information on 
product safety issues in order to prevent rampant speculation and sensationalism in the 
international media by “China” and “business” pundits. Although this is counter-intuitive 
to the nature of China’s ruling regime, the results of this approach will bolster confidence 
in China’s reputation for product safety.  
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a. Recommendations 
• Do not issues unfounded denials whenever a product safety issue is 
exposed in the international media. 
• Aggressively investigate and provide substantive information to the media 
in order to control the spin and prevent sensationalistic reporting that 
undermines consumer confidence in Chinese products. 
b. Barriers to Implementation 
Similar to the barriers that existed for a free press, it is unlikely that 
China’s central government will unnecessarily expose weaknesses in the government’s 
consumer product safety regime in order to control the spin of the international media. 
Likewise, many of China’s leaders and people earnestly believe that the recent flap over 
consumer product safety is the result of the $256 billion trade deficit (2007) between 
China and the United States.197 Hence, it is only natural for Chinese officials to issue 
defensive reactions in the international media when news of a consumer product safety 
scandal initially breaks in China. However, China’s central government has learned from 
previous mistakes in public relations, so the government has hired a public relations firm 
and a Washington lobbyist to assist with the country’s brand image.198 
First, China’s central government has hired Ogilvy Public Relations firm 
to assist China in navigating the negative international reaction to recent product safety 
scandals.199 Furthermore, China hopes to restore consumer confidence in the “Made in 
China” brand with Ogilvy’s expert guidance and support in the area of public relations 
and branding.200 Although hiring a public relations firm to assist in managing China’s 
relations with the world is an unusual action for a sovereign nation, it may be one of the 
most perceptive responses that the Chinese government has made.  
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Second, China has also hired Patton Boggs LLP, a well-known 
Washington lobbyist firm, to press China’s case with the U.S. Congress.201 Patton Boggs 
LLP will attempt to dissuade the U.S. Congress from adopting “get tough on China” 
policies that have been touted by pundits and the public alike in response to a growing 
Sino-U.S. trade deficit and numerous consumer product safety incidents.202 Lobbying the 
U.S. Congress represents another unprecedented move by China’s central government; 
however, China should consider paying Patton Boggs LLP more than $22,000 per month 
if it hopes to achieve measureable results within the policy-making circles of 
Washington, D.C.203 
In summary, China’s central government will not grant the media access 
required to assuage consumer fears related to the “Made in China” brand, but China has 
taken the next best measure by hiring a public relations firm and a lobbyist to mend 
relations and restore consumer confidence.  
c. Practical Recommendations 
China’s central government should continue its relationship with Ogilvy 
and Patton Boggs, and it should head the professional advice administered by both firms 
in order to restore the “Made in China” brand.  
3. Protectionism 
Protectionism reverses the economic progress and prosperity that globalization 
has brought the United States and China. Although some quality-related bans on Chinese 
products may be issued by the U.S. government on some food, drugs, and toys, the 
Chinese government must resist a retaliatory protectionist response. A retaliatory 
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response by China could possibly escalate into a trade war between the United States and 
China. A trade war would only produce economic losers on both sides of the equation. 
a. Recommendations 
• Avoid retaliatory protectionist actions in the event a major trading partner 
issues a quality-related ban on a Chinese product. 
b. Barriers to Implementation 
Protectionism represents an external response to product safety concerns 
and a growing Sino-global trade deficit, so China’s central government has little 
influence over foreign governments and multinational corporations with respect to 
protectionist actions that either entity may choose to adopt. Trade analysts argue that 
protectionist responses have more to do with trade deficits than actual concerns over the 
safety of China’s exports.204 In 2006, China’s global exports reached a staggering $969 
billion ($2.6 billion per day), and the Sino-U.S. trade deficit has risen steadily over the 
past three decades to a frightening $256 billion (2007) with no signs of abatement.205 In 
addition to the Sino-U.S. trade deficit, China holds an estimated $1.5 trillion in foreign 
exchange reserves, which is largely comprised of U.S. Treasury Securities.206 China has 
rattled a hegemonic United States that perceives a loss of power in the international 
political and economic arena to a rising juggernaut, the People’s Republic of China. 
Hence, protectionist actions are the likely response by U.S. Congressional leaders under 
the guise of U.S. consumer protection. China’s central government has no recourse of 
action against the United States with the exception of instituting limited bans on a paltry 
sum ($65.2 billion in 2007) of U.S. imports to China.207 Unfortunately, this measure 
would only exacerbate the possibility of a limited trade war between the United States 
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and China. In the end, both trading partners would suffer economic losses, yet China 
would suffer more severely than the United States.  
c. Practical Recommendations 
Although China has already rejected multiple food shipments from the 
United States for poor quality and alleged spoilage, China should reverse course and 
accept products from its major trading partners unless undisputable evidence exists with 
respect to the poor quality or danger presented by an imported product. China’s central 
government must avoid the impropriety of protectionist actions in order to avoid further 
turmoil aroused by foreign governments and their populations with respect to the current 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. HYPOTHESIS STATEMENT 
1. Summary of Hypothesis 
China must improve its consumer product safety regime to maintain a robust 
export market for food and drugs in order to protect its economic growth. Economic 
growth serves as one of many pillars that ensure political stability for China’s central 
government, so the central government as a matter of internal security must address 
product safety concerns that could potentially damage China’s export driven economy.  
a. Primary Hypothesis  
As China’s consumer product safety regime improves, China’s export 
market for food and drug products will increase. 
b. Subordinate Hypothesis 
Revision and improvement in China’s domestic product safety regulatory 
regime – laws, law enforcement, and domestic interagency cooperation – in addition to 
the adoption of international consumer product safety best practices for developing 
countries provide China with a short-term, affordable, and feasible solution to improve its 
product safety regulatory regime.  
B. SUMMARY 
China’s central government’s response to the current challenge of consumer 
product safety in the food and drug arena will likely be a key factor in its ability to 
sustain robust economic growth over the next decade. Many measures have been 
proposed here; however, three measures have the ability to strike at the heart of the 
consumer product safety problem and restore consumer faith in the “Made in China” 
  84
brand. First, China must stem corruption at the local level through independent regulatory 
and law enforcement agencies that hold local government leaders and the local managers 
of Chinese companies accountable.208 Second, China must permit greater freedom of the 
press because the media provides a force multiplier that can expose systemic problems of 
corruption in relation to product safety issues. Finally, China must create an independent 
judicial system that consistently holds corrupt officials and companies that intentionally 
violate product safety laws accountable. 
These measures will change the political economy of China on many levels, and 
many of these measures will break established patterns of behavior by Chinese 
Communist Party officials and Chinese companies. Change will not be easy; however, it 
is necessary in order to preserve China’s sustained economic growth and political 
stability and establish the “Made in China” brand as a marker of quality and reliability.  
1. Beijing Should Clean House (Formal/Internal Response) 
The primary weakness of China’s consumer product safety regime lies with 
systemic corruption and weak enforcement of a disparate and nascent product safety 
regime. China’s product safety regulations require competent and robust regulatory 
enforcement bodies centralized under a single coordinating authority. Furthermore, 
multinational corporations and China’s central government must realign economic 
incentives for Chinese producers to reduce corruption. If incentives fail to dissuade 
corrupt practices then individuals and firms must be held accountable through an 
independent judiciary system that is capable administering civil and governmental 
lawsuits. A functional product safety regime in China will require nearly a decade of 
focused effort; however, China should begin its journey by bolstering law enforcement in 
order to reduce corruption. 
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2. Beijing Should Seek Help and Cooperation (Formal/External 
Response) 
China has expanded its cooperation with international product safety regulatory 
agencies in order to restore consumer confidence amongst its major trading partners and 
to learn from the best practices from other industrialized economies. International 
cooperation through the Beijing Olympic Food Safety Expert Committee paid substantial 
dividends as China managed to avoid any food or drug related scandals throughout the 
2008 Beijing Summer Olympics. Ironically, the melamine tainted milk scandal of 
September 2008 most likely destroyed international credibility that China gained from 
the Olympic Games. Additionally, imagine the outrage of a Chinese peasant that 
witnessed the exceptional effort made by China’s central government to protect foreign 
athletes, journalist, and tourist during the Olympics, yet the same government made very 
little effort to protect its own population from dangerous food and drug products.  
In addition to China’s efforts to improve product safety during the Olympic 
Games, China has collaborated with the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission and 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to improve training and inspection methods 
within China’s consumer product safety regime. International product regulatory agencies 
also periodically inspect food and drug producers in China; however, a constrained 
timeline and language barriers often hamper these agencies during the inspections.209 
Additionally, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the U.S. Consumer Product 
Safety Commission are underfunded and undermanned in an era in which trade between 
nations has increase so rapidly, particularly from China. Currently, the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration only inspects one percent of the products shipped into the United 
States, additionally if the agency started to conduct source point inspections of every 
international drug supplier to the United States, it would take the agency 13 years to 
complete the inspections with its current funding and manpower.210 China’s regulatory  
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bodies face similar labor and funding problems, so the best assistance that international 
product safety regulatory bodies can provide to China is training with a focus on best 
practices. 
3. Beijing Should Explore Nonregulatory Solutions (Informal/Internal 
Response) 
China also has a myriad of options with respect to lessons learned from other 
countries and numerous international standards that address product safety and quality 
issues. Today, Japan serves as benchmark of quality, even though five decades ago the 
“Made in Japan” brand meant cheap, shoddy, and unreliable consumer goods. Japan’s 
rise from a substandard producer relied upon quality engineering principles established 
by W. Edward Deming, and these principles have been further refined into the Toyota 
Production System that is highly regarded by international consumers for producing 
goods that are both safe and reliable.211 If Japan found its path to quality, then it is 
reasonable that China can do the same. 
Even beyond lessons learned from other countries, China can draw from 
preexisting international product safety standards specifically tailored for food and drugs, 
such as ISO 22000 or CODEX.212 Admittedly, the implementation of international 
standards would carve into thin margins for China’s producers or force China’s producers 
to raise their wholesale cost for goods. Either option is unsavory, yet the long-term 
dividends from implementing recognized international standards would likely assist 
China in moving up the value chain of production. Hence, China would be able to 
continue to fuel its robust economic growth for many years to come.  
China should avail itself of lessons produced from other countries’ product safety 
woes, and it should adopt an international product safety standard that bolsters  the 
confidence of its major trading partners. 
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4. Beijing Should Present Its Case (Informal/External Response) 
In the information age, domestic and international public opinion matters to 
multinational corporations, brands, and even countries. Since China serves as the 
“world’s manufacturing floor” for outsourced goods and inexpensive products, “Made in 
China” is a brand.213 Hence, China’s central government and China’s producers must 
defend their brand in order to sustain economic growth. Although the media is unlikely to 
receive free reign in China, the central government should at least permit the media to 
expose corrupt public officials and dangerous producers in order to amplify the central 
government’s effort to protect consumers. Additionally, the central government must 
continue to manage international consumers’ perceptions of Chinese goods through 
intense public relations efforts. It is highly unlikely that international consumers will 
boycott low-cost Chinese items; however, one family in America did eliminate all items 
“Made in China” for one year.214 Fortunately, most consumers would not endure the 
daunting task of avoiding Chinese products in the marketplace, yet China cannot continue 
to take for granted the resentment and concern building in the international body of 
consumers on the issue of dangerous products produced in China. Consumer resentment 
and concern could lead other governments to take protectionist actions against China 
under the guise of protecting their domestic consumers. These actions could hurt China’s 
economy, so China must avoid any provocation that could set a limited trade war in 
motion between it and its major trading partners.   
5. Conclusive Summary 
China’s central government’s response to the current challenge of consumer 
product safety in the food and drug arena will likely be a key factor in its ability to 
sustain robust economic growth over the next decade. Many measures have been 
proposed here; however, three measures have the ability to strike at the heart of the 
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consumer product safety problem and restore consumer faith in the “Made in China” 
brand. First, China must stem corruption at the local level through independent regulatory 
and law enforcement agencies that hold local government leaders and the local managers 
of Chinese companies accountable.215 Second, China must permit greater freedom of the 
press because the media provides a force multiplier that can expose systemic problems of 
corruption in relation to product safety issues. Finally, China must create an independent 
judicial system that consistently holds corrupt officials and companies that intentionally 
violate product safety laws accountable. 
These measures will change the political economy of China on many levels, and 
many of these measures will break established patterns of behavior by Chinese 
Communist Party officials and Chinese companies. Change will not be easy; however, it 
is necessary in order to preserve China’s sustained economic growth and political 
stability and establish the “Made in China” brand as a marker of quality and reliability.  
C. SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS AND PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 
Corruption pervades China’s business, political, and regulatory culture. 
Individuals focus on short-term gains rather than long-term sustainable practices that 
would induce economic growth that is robust enough to mitigate rampant corruption 
throughout China. In order to curb corruption, corrupt participants must be punished, and 
China’s producers in cooperation with the central government must realign economic 
incentives to eliminate opportunities that reward corrupt practices. Although corruption 
may appear to be a mild symptom that slows China’s trade growth, it has the potential to 
destabilize the long-term development of the Chinese economy. 
In addition to corruption, China’s lack of an independent judicial system and 
poorly funded regulatory bodies provides opportunities for producers to commit 
unscrupulous acts without significant negative repercussions. Regulatory bodies must be  
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pervasive enough to penetrate local businesses guarded by corrupt political officials, and 
China’s judicial system should welcome civil suits against Chinese producers that kill or 
harm domestic or international consumers.  
D. FURTHER RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS 
China’s weak consumer product safety regime has only received significant 
attention from international consumers since early 2007, so copious research 
opportunities remain with respect to the actual progress made by China in coping with 
deadly and embarrassing product safety scandals over the last eighteen months.  
First, researchers should investigate the impact and outcome of retired Vice 
Premier Wu Yi’s task force to protect the “Made in China” brand in late 2007. No reports 
on this task force’s progress or results have been made, even through Wu Yi retired and 
the task force disbanded. Was the task force only a ruse to appease angry international 
consumers? 
Second, corruption in China can be mitigated through the use of both positive 
economic incentives and negative economic incentives. What are the economic 
incentives available to China’s central government, China’s producers, and multinational 
corporations? What is the proper balance of these incentives? 
Third, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration is grossly underfunded and 
undermanned, so how can the United States government protect Americans from a 
bioterrorism incident that could potentially contaminate America’s food supply? How 
would the United States government respond to the contamination of America’s food 
supply from imported goods? Would the United States government hold the exporting 
nation responsible for the incident? How can American’s prevent a bioterrorist attack? 
There are numerous other aspects to this rich topic that merit exploration via 
multi-disciplinary studies; however, research material is difficult to attain because of 
limited access to source data and reports from China’s central government on issues of 
product safety. Additionally, the contemporary nature of this topic also lends itself to 
further revelations and assessments of China’s progress towards a safer Consumer 
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APPENDIX: DEMING’S 14 POINTS OF INDUSTRY 
Deming highlights 14 practices that transformed Japan’s product quality regime. 
Table 5.   The 14 Points of Industry.216 
 The 14 Points of Industry 
1 Create a consistency of purpose designed to drive the organization toward product and 
service improvement. Companies face today’s and tomorrows problems. It is easy to fixate 
on the problems of today. Overcoming tomorrow’s problems; however, requires focus and 
constancy of purpose. Accept the responsibility to innovate. 
2 As a manager, accept the role of leading the company toward change. The standard level of 
mistakes can no longer be tolerated. Transformation is required. 
3 Free yourself from a dependence on inspection in order to achieve quality. Build quality into 
the product in the first place. Inspecting to insure quality comes too late in the process. It 
costs too much to correct errors at this stage; get it right up front. 
4 Stop awarding business [to suppliers] on the basis of price. Instead, minimize total long-
term cost and move toward a single supplier relationship for any one item based on a long-
term relationship built on loyalty and trust. Quality can be more important than price 
5 To decrease costs, continually and permanently improve the production system. 
6 Institute a program of job training. [Chinese] (U.S.) factory workers need to be better 
trained, with wider skills, and they need to be given more flexibility in their jobs 
assignments. 
7 Overhaul the supervision of management, and institute leadership. Management’s job isn’t 
supervision: its leadership. Eliminate the focus on outcome (hitting targets and management 
by objective). Leaders must understand the work that they oversee. 
8 Stamp out fear in the workplace, so people can work together effectively. Fear increases 
turnover and causes breakdowns in quality. 
9 Eliminate the barriers between departments. Everyone in the company has something to 
share, but that won’t help if your company is built around silos. 
10 Get rid of slogans, cheerleading and targets that create adversarial relationships. Most poor 
productivity is caused by the system and, therefore, is beyond the power of workers to 
ameliorate. Lose those posters that state, “Your work is your self-portrait.” Those platitudes 
are an insult to the intelligence of the workers. 
11 Eliminate quotas, and eliminate management by objective or numbers. Substitute leadership. 
You don’t want to know how many widgets were made. You want to know the number of 
good one produced, and at what cost. 
12 Remove barriers that take pride of workmanship away from the worker, including barriers 
that affect those in management or engineering. Give people dignity in their work and they 
will provide a better quality product. 
13 Install a strong program of education and self-improvement. 
14 Make achieving the transformation everybody’s job 
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